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I. INTRODUCTION 
How does the law reconcile the per se illegality of an economically 
ambiguous practice with enforcement doctrines that permit only those 
directly suffering anticompetitive harm to sue and require them to prove 
damages coherently? The question is critical in resale price maintenance 
(“RPM”) cases because the practice, though illegal per se, may produce no 
anticompetitive harm, injure parties more proximate to the violation than the 
plaintiffs, or cause damages resistant to reasonable estimation. 
In 1911, the Supreme Court held in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. 
Park & Sons Co.1 that an agreement between a seller and its customer 
specifying the minimum price at which the customer may resell the product 
is illegal per se. No more need be proven to establish a violation of the 
antitrust laws than the fact of the so-called RPM agreement.2 For practices 
 1. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 2. Specifically, a resale price maintenance agreement violates Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1. Resale price maintenance can be defined broadly as any practice used by a seller to induce 
a purchaser to set a higher resale price than it otherwise would. So defined, RPM would encompass a 
manufacturer’s practice of announcing that it will stop selling to any dealer that charges a price less 
than one specified by the manufacturer, if dealers respond by charging higher prices than they 
otherwise would have charged. But that practice would not constitute an “agreement,” which is 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/1
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that are not per se lawful, the antitrust alternative to per se condemnation is 
rule of reason analysis, which requires a more or less detailed examination of 
a practice in the commercial setting in which it is challenged in order to 
determine its competitive effects.3 Per se invalidation is supposed to be 
reserved for “agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly 
anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish 
their illegality.”4 Once the Court is convinced that a kind of restraint has 
“predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect” and “limited potential for 
procompetitive benefit,”5 per se condemnation facilitates business planning 
by reducing legal uncertainty, and it promotes efficiency in the 
administration of the law by eliminating the need for a costly inquiry into the 
effects of the practice in individual cases.6
The economic effects of RPM, however, are not “plainly 
anticompetitive.” Indeed, economic theory establishes that RPM can be 
procompetitive, and empirical evidence indicates that it usually is.7 What, 
 
 
required for a Section 1 violation. See infra notes 124–68 and accompanying text. Alternatively, RPM 
can be defined narrowly as antitrust agreements having the described effect on resale prices. In 
general, we use the term RPM in its broad sense.  
 3. In fact, though the per se rule and the rule-of-reason standard are recognized categories of 
antitrust analysis, the appropriate review of any given case falls somewhere on a continuum defined by 
an increasing level of scrutiny of the anticompetitive harm alleged and the procompetitive 
justifications offered. See Cal. Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 780–81 (1999) (“[T]here is 
generally no categorical line to be drawn between restraints that give rise to an intuitively obvious 
inference of anticompetitive effect and those that call for more detailed treatment. What is required, 
rather, is an enquiry meet for the case, looking to the circumstances, details, and logic of a restraint.”). 
On the difference between per se and rule-of-reason analysis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW 39–40 (2d ed. 2001) (“A rule singles out one or a few facts and makes it or them legally 
determinative. A standard allows a more open-ended inquiry.”). 
 4. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978). See also NYNEX 
Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 133 (1998) (“[C]ertain kinds of agreements will so often prove so 
harmful to competition and so rarely prove justified that the antitrust laws do not require proof that an 
agreement of that kind is, in fact, anticompetitive in the particular circumstances. An agreement of 
such a kind is unlawful per se.”) (citations omitted).  
 5. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
 6. The Court has explained the value of the per se rule as follows: 
 This principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of restraints which are 
proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned, but it also 
avoids the necessity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the 
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an effort to determine at 
large whether a particular restraint has been unreasonable—an inquiry so often wholly fruitless 
when undertaken. 
N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 194 (3d ed. 2005) (noting that antitrust “has had to devise shortcuts for 
evaluating business practices” and that the per se rule “requires little or no inquiry into market power 
or actual anticompetitive effects”); KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW: ECONOMIC THEORY AND 
COMMON LAW EVOLUTION 116 (2003). 
 7. See infra notes 213–47 and accompanying text. 
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then, to make of Dr. Miles? In 1911, the Court’s conception of “competition” 
was ill-formed. Any practice that restricted the freedom of rivals could be 
termed “anticompetitive,” and RPM unquestionably limited the pricing 
discretion of competing resellers, even if resellers agreed to the restraint. In 
addition, the Court misapprehended the effect of RPM on consumers, 
reasoning that consumers must be injured when a practice prevents a retailer 
from lowering a price. Over the next ninety-plus years, the Court came to 
view the antitrust laws as promoting the goal of economic efficiency or 
consumer surplus.8 “Competition” came to be understood as a process that 
promoted that goal, rather than merely a process of rivalry, and so a practice 
was anticompetitive only when it reduced the relevant measure of welfare.9 
Simultaneously, the Court’s analysis of the competitive effects of business 
practices became more sophisticated.10 The Court began to recognize the 
welfare-increasing capacity of practices that once appeared obviously 
welfare-reducing, and it gained more confidence in the judiciary’s ability to 
identify truly anticompetitive arrangements in litigation at tolerable costs. 
 8. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 427 (2d ed. 1993) (“By and large, 
with some ambiguity at times, the more recent cases have adopted a consumer welfare model.”); 
POSNER, supra note 3, at ix (“Almost everyone professionally involved in antitrust today . . . not only 
agrees that the only goal of the antitrust laws should be to promote economic welfare, but also agrees 
on the essential tenets of economic theory that should be used to determine the consistency of specific 
business practices with that goal.”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. 
REV. 213 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Reckoning of Post-Chicago Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO 
DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 1–3 (Antonio Cucinotta et al. eds., 2002); Michael S. Jacobs, An 
Essay on the Normative Foundations of Antitrust Economics, 74 N.C. L. REV. 219 (1995); William H. 
Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Characterization, Antitrust Injury, and 
Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221 (1989). There is a technical difference between 
efficiency and consumer surplus. It usually has no antitrust policy implications, but it can in some 
circumstances, including the situation in which a practice is used to price discriminate. See infra notes 
271–82 and accompanying text. Consumer surplus is the amount above the price paid that a consumer 
would be willing to pay for the units purchased; producer surplus is the maximum amount of revenue a 
producer would be willing to lose and still produce the product. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & 
JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 71 (3d ed. 2000). Total welfare can be 
defined as the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus. Id. Economic efficiency is the 
combination of allocative and productive efficiency. Id. at 69–70. In most cases, a practice that reduces 
consumer surplus, or consumer welfare, reduces efficiency, or total welfare. But consumer welfare can 
be reduced without affecting efficiency, if any losses absorbed by consumers become gains for 
producers. In those cases, the appropriate antitrust standard matters, and the Court has never 
definitively identified it. See generally Daniel J. Gifford & Robert T. Kudrle, Rhetoric and Reality in 
the Merger Standards of the United States, Canada, and the European Union, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 423, 
425–26, 430–33 (2005).  
 9. See BORK, supra note 8, at 427; POSNER, supra note 3, at 28–29. 
 10. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 8, at 429 (observing that the “law’s vision of economic reality 
has greatly improved” since the 1970s); POSNER, supra note 3, at x (noting that “antitrust law has 
almost since its beginning been much influenced by economics, and economics is an improving 
discipline”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss3/1
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As a result of this process, the Court repudiated the rule of per se illegality 
of non-price vertical restraints, such as territorial restrictions imposed by a 
manufacturer on a distributor.11 It repudiated the rule of per se illegality of 
vertical maximum price fixing.12 It explicitly limited the scope of the per se 
rule as applied to boycotts.13 It specified a “per se” analysis of tying 
arrangements that incorporated much if not all of a reasonableness inquiry.14 
It retained the per se rule against horizontal price fixing, but it required a 
significant analysis of a restraint’s commercial context before the restraint 
can be characterized as price fixing.15  
The process of reforming substantive antitrust law also touched the 
treatment of RPM. The Court made an RPM agreement more difficult to 
prove. It held that dealers’ complaints to a manufacturer that a rival is 
undercutting a suggested minimum resale price followed by the 
manufacturer’s termination of the discounting dealer is insufficient to 
establish an agreement on resale price.16 And it held that an agreement 
between a manufacturer and one dealer that the manufacturer would 
terminate a rival, price-cutting dealer does not imply an illegal RPM 
agreement.17 But the Court has never retreated from the rule that an RPM 
agreement, once found, is per se illegal.18 Indeed, it distinguished vertical 
price restraints in overturning the per se illegality of vertical non-price 
restraints,19 and in a later case explicitly declined the government’s request 
that it repudiate the rule.20
While the process of substantive law reformation was occurring, the 
Court embarked on a parallel effort to develop rules of private enforcement 
that would conduce toward the welfare-maximization objective of antitrust 
law. The Court recognized that the deleterious effects of inefficient 
substantive rules could be lessened by reducing the penalties for their 
violation.21 The Court held, therefore, that a private plaintiff may recover 
 11. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 12. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
 13. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985). 
 14. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
 15. See, e.g., Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). 
 16. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). 
 17. See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 18. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 8, at 436 (noting that “the Court retains the rule of per se 
illegality for vertical price fixing mistakenly laid down in the 1911 Dr. Miles decision”); POSNER, 
supra note 3, at 189 (“The per se rule against resale price maintenance remains. It is a sad mistake. 
There is neither theoretical basis, nor empirical support, for thinking the practice generally 
anticompetitive.”) (footnote omitted). 
 19. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 51 n.18 (1977). 
 20. See Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 761 n.7. 
 21. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Antitrust Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust Law, 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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damages not for just any loss caused by an antitrust violation, but only for an 
antitrust injury—the kind of injury the antitrust laws were designed to 
prevent.22 An efficient practice might be illegal as a matter of substantive 
law, but because it causes no antitrust injury, the offender will not face the 
deterrent of treble damage liability. Further, the Court recognized that 
damage liability even for truly anticompetitive conduct could be excessive,23 
and that private antitrust enforcement is more effective when the right to 
recover damages is limited to and concentrated in relatively direct victims.24 
The Court held, therefore, that not all those suffering antitrust injury may 
recover, but only a subset, the victims who have antitrust standing.25 The 
doctrine decreases the risk of excessive antitrust penalties by preventing 
remote victims from recovering. The Court also held that, when an 
anticompetitive overcharge contained in the price of a good is imposed on 
buyers who pass on part of the overcharge in the resale price of the good, 
only the direct purchasers have antitrust standing, and they may recover 
damages measured by the full overcharge.26 Thus remote purchasers cannot 
recover damages from an unlawful monopolist or cartel, even if they absorb 
the bulk of the overcharge.  
The idea that a per se illegal practice might be immune from private 
enforcement seems incongruous, but that is the implication of a rigorous 
antitrust injury doctrine grounded in an efficiency-based conception of 
antitrust law coupled with an overbroad rule of liability. One purpose of this 
Article is to apply economic theory to identify antitrust injuries caused by 
RPM in various settings. In addition, antitrust law has long required plaintiffs 
to estimate reasonably if not precisely the magnitude of the harm they 
suffered as a result of the violation,27 and we apply this mandate to claims of 
injury caused by RPM. We demonstrate that plaintiffs will often be hard-
pressed—if not unable—to prove damages in an economically coherent 
fashion. We also explore the implications of the prohibition against indirect 
 
 
ANTITRUST, Fall 2002, at 20.  
 22. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). The Court later 
held that a private plaintiff seeking equitable relief must prove threatened antitrust injury. See Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 113 (1986). 
 23. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979) (“A central premise of our holding in 
Hawaii was concern over duplicative recoveries.”); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 263–64 
(1972) (refusing to allow an action by a state for injury to its general economy because such an action 
would “open the door to duplicative recoveries”). 
 24. See generally William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1445 (1985) [hereinafter Page, Scope of Liability]. 
 25. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
535 n.31 (1983). 
 26. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 734–35 (1977). 
 27. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946). 
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purchaser suits in the context of RPM. In all, the Article provides a 
comprehensive examination of the major issues involved in private actions to 
obtain damages for illegal RPM agreements.  
We begin in the next Part with an overview of the legal requirements for 
plaintiffs to establish antitrust injury and antitrust standing. We briefly survey 
the history of RPM law in Part III, demonstrating that the Court’s failure to 
provide a coherent economic case for per se condemnation creates nearly 
insurmountable problems for private plaintiffs in proving antitrust injury and 
damages. We illustrate these problems in Part IV through an examination of 
various business motivations for using RPM—some with anticompetitive 
effects, some with procompetitive effects, and some with confounding 
effects. Sorting out the competitive effects of a particular RPM plan is no 
mean feat. Consequently, the private plaintiff faces a substantial, if not 
insurmountable, barrier in proving antitrust injury and damages. Because of 
the formidable impediments faced by private antitrust plaintiffs, one might 
expect that a defendant would be reluctant to pay anything to settle a private 
RPM action. But a large number of RPM cases do settle, and Part V 
addresses the possible reasons for this surprising outcome. We offer some 
final thoughts in Part VI. 
II. LEGAL REQUIREMENTS OF PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT 
The federal antitrust laws are enforced concurrently by the Antitrust 
Division of the Department of Justice,28 the Federal Trade Commission,29 
state attorneys general,30 and private plaintiffs. Section 4 of the Clayton Act 
authorizes private actions for treble damages: “[A]ny person who shall be 
injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the 
 28. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 15a, 25 (2000). 
 29. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 11, 45 (2000). 
 30. When a state is injured or threatened with loss in its proprietary capacity by an antitrust 
violation, it can sue, typically through its attorney general, and in that setting occupies the procedural 
position of a private plaintiff. It is a “person” injured in its property or threatened with loss for 
purposes of Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2000). But Section 4C of the 
Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (2000), also allows state attorneys general to act as parens patriae on 
behalf of their citizens and to recover treble damages. See generally ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. 
KASERMAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 85–86 (1985); Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the 
Enforcement of Antitrust Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT 252 
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004); Kevin J. O’Connor, Antitrust Enforcement 
Regarding Vertical Restraints by States Attorneys General, SE47 ALI-ABA 257, 265 (2000). In this 
capacity, state attorneys general function as public enforcers of the federal antitrust statutes. Of course, 
state attorneys general may also have authority to enforce state antitrust laws. Cf. California v. ARC 
Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989) (holding that state antitrust laws inconsistent with the federal rule 
barring indirect purchaser suits are not preempted). 
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antitrust laws may sue therefor . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s 
fee.”31 The right to obtain treble damages creates a powerful economic 
incentive for private antitrust enforcement. Given that an antitrust violation 
has occurred, the expected value of a suit to a risk-neutral victim will be 
positive as long as the probability of winning times the trebled damages 
exceeds the probability of losing times the plaintiff’s litigation costs.32 In that 
event, a private antitrust suit may appear ex ante to be quite profitable and 
surely will be so ex post if the plaintiff is successful.33
Although Section 4 appears expansive, the Court has interpreted it to 
impose strict limits on the universe of antitrust claimants. To be cognizable, 
not only must the antitrust violation cause an injury in fact to the plaintiff’s 
business or property,34 but the harm must be an antitrust injury, and only 
those persons suffering relatively direct antitrust injuries have antitrust 
standing to recover.35 Further, the plaintiff must offer a coherent method of 
estimating damages. As we explain below, the requirements of an antitrust 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000). Private parties also are authorized to sue for equitable relief. See 15 
U.S.C. § 26 (2000). Most private antitrust plaintiffs seek damages, and this Article is confined to 
damage actions. 
 32. The expected value of a private suit is E[V] = p(3D) + (1 - p)(0) - (1 - p)(C), where E is the 
expectations operator, p is the (subjective) probability of winning the suit, D is the sum of the 
monetary damages, (1 - p) is the probability of losing, and C is the plaintiff’s cost of litigation. This 
expression simplifies to E[V] = p(3D) - (1 - p)(C). 
 In the case of contingent fees, the arithmetic is a bit more complicated. For example, the contract 
between the plaintiff and his attorney may have the following provisions: (1) if the suit is unsuccessful, 
the attorney bears all of the litigation costs; (2) if the suit is successful, (a) the attorney’s fee will be a 
share of the treble damages, or α(3D) where α equals the fraction of the award that goes to the 
attorney, (b) the court’s award will include a reasonable attorney’s fee (A), and (c) the amount awarded 
by the court will be deducted from the attorney’s share of the trebled damages, or α(3D) - A. Thus, the 
expected value of the suit in this scenario to the plaintiff is E[V] = p(3D) - p[α(3D) - A], which 
simplifies to E[V] = p[(1 - α)(3D) + A]. 
 Because α is the fraction of the award that goes to the attorney, (1-α) is therefore the plaintiff’s 
share of the award. Other contractual arrangements are possible as well and will have somewhat 
different results. Further complications are added by including indirect costs of litigation, such as the 
time and attention of the plaintiff’s managers and staff, which the plaintiff will bear in any event. 
 33. There is an obvious potential for abuse due to the possible profit that can be earned. For more 
fundamental concerns regarding the threat of antitrust suits to reduce the competitive vigor of rivals, 
see Arthur D. Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflections on the New Antitrust 
Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353; William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert 
Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247 (1985). 
 34. Once the Court held that an overcharge paid by consumers as a result of an antitrust violation 
is injury to their “property” (see Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979)), the “business or 
property” limitation became largely inconsequential. See generally 11 JOSEPH P. BAUER, FEDERAL 
ANTITRUST LAW 18–20 (1998). We will not discuss this limitation further. 
 35. See generally 2 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP & ROGER D. BLAIR, ANTITRUST 
LAW ¶ 335–61, ¶ 337 (2d ed. 2000); 11 BAUER, supra note 34, at 6–18, 20–21, 47–48. 
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injury and a sound method of calculating damages may pose significant 
problems for private plaintiffs alleging injury from RPM. 
A. Antitrust Injury 
Once the Court recognized that the antitrust laws are intended to 
accomplish a specific objective, the promotion of some kind of economic 
welfare, it was able to hold that only losses closely connected to that 
objective are compensable. In the 1977 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc.,36 case, the Court held that a plaintiff may only recover damages for 
antitrust injuries:  
Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful. The injury should reflect the 
anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of anticompetitive acts 
made possible by the violation. It should, in short, be “the type of loss 
that the claimed violations . . . would be likely to cause.”37  
As the Court later described the requirement, the plaintiff must show that 
it was “adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant’s 
conduct.”38 The antitrust injury requirement thus connects the plaintiff’s 
injury to the economic rationale of the antitrust laws.39
Brunswick involved an allegation that the defendant unlawfully acquired 
failing bowling alleys that would otherwise have gone bankrupt.40 The 
plaintiffs operated competing bowling centers and sued to recover the profits 
they would have earned had the acquired alleys left the market.41 The 
economic perversity of the plaintiffs’ claim was unmistakable: the plaintiffs 
wanted to recover immediate losses suffered not from a reduction in 
competition, but from a continuation of it.42 Any increase in competition is 
 36. 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 37. Id. at 489 (alteration in original). 
 38. ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990) (emphasis omitted). 
 39. See 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 337c; Jonathan M. Jacobson & 
Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-
O-Mat, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 273, 286 (1998); William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic 
Efficiency: An Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 467 (1980) [hereinafter Page, Antitrust 
Damages]; Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 24. See also Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1539 (1989); Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, The 
Role of Economics in Defining Antitrust Injury and Standing, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 
127 (1996). 
 40. See Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 479–80.
 41. See id. at 479–81. 
 42. See id. at 488. 
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likely to injure suppliers in a market as it benefits consumers. In subsequent 
cases, the Court defined the Brunswick principle broadly and applied it 
widely, turning the antitrust injury doctrine into a powerful force to 
rationalize private antitrust enforcement. The Court applied the doctrine 
again in the merger area, holding that a private plaintiff must assert 
threatened antitrust injury in order to seek equitable relief under Section 16 
of the Clayton Act43 to prevent an acquisition.44 It applied the doctrine to 
allegations of predatory pricing,45 price discrimination,46 and maximum 
vertical price fixing.47
As the doctrine was shaped, the Court made clear that it does not merely 
disallow losses that flow from an increase in competition. Rather, even a 
practice that reduces competition may be accompanied by losses that are not 
compensable because they do not flow from the competition-reducing aspect 
of the practice. The practice must reduce welfare and predictably increase the 
probability of the kind of harm the plaintiff asserts.48 The antitrust injury 
doctrine poses no conceptual problem when a challenged practice reduces the 
relevant measure of welfare. A claim may be dismissed because a particular 
plaintiff did not suffer an antitrust injury as a result of the practice, or because 
a plaintiff who did suffer an antitrust injury is asserting a loss that is not 
antitrust injury. Even so, antitrust injury, by definition, is suffered by 
someone. But if a practice causes no welfare loss and is nevertheless 
unlawful, the antitrust injury doctrine implies that no private party can 
establish the right to sue. And that conundrum is not merely a theoretical 
possibility: The pre-1970s history of the antitrust laws is marked by decisions 
outlawing practices that reduced producer welfare or were mistakenly 
thought to injure consumers.49  
 43. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2000). 
 44. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
 45. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585–86 (1986). 
 46. See J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 562 (1981). 
 47. ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 331 (1990). 
 48. This is an application of the tort principle that defendant’s misconduct must be “causally 
linked” to the plaintiff’s harm. See generally Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of 
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 71–72 (1975) (“There is a causal link 
between an act or activity and an injury when we conclude on the basis of the available evidence that 
the recurrence of that act or activity will increase the chances that the injury will also occur.”); 
Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 388 n.7 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 49. Books analyzing the extent to which the Supreme Court failed to reach decisions promoting 
economic welfare include BORK, supra note 8, and POSNER, supra note 3. Some of the more 
prominent decisions are United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (condemning a 
cooperative arrangement among small competitors); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) 
(condemning a vertical maximum price fixing agreement); United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 
U.S. 270 (1966) (condemning a horizontal merger); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 
(1962) (condemning a horizontal and vertical merger); N. Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) 
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Maximum, non-predatory resale price fixing posed the problem starkly. 
Unless the resale price fixed is really a price floor,50 the practice actually 
increases consumer welfare.51 In 1968, however, when the Court was 
inclined to place independent value on the welfare of suppliers, the Court 
held the practice illegal per se.52 The Court revisited the practice twenty-two 
years later in ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co.,53 after it had adopted a different 
conception of the laws’ purpose, but chose not to reconsider the merits of the 
per se rule. The Court also might have held that the antitrust injury doctrine is 
simply inapplicable to per se antitrust violations, but it did not.54 Rather, it 
held that a competitor of the dealer subject to the price ceiling who loses 
profits as a result of the fixed maximum price does not suffer antitrust 
injury.55 True enough, but does anyone suffer antitrust injury? One lower 
court scratched its head, reasoning that if the practice causes no relevant 
welfare loss but must cause antitrust injury, then antitrust injury must 
embrace losses that are not connected to inefficiency.56 The conclusion that 
the practice causes antitrust injury was virtually mandated by ARCO itself, 
where the Court in dicta said that dealers subject to the constraint and 
consumers may sue.57 Another lower court, taking its cue from ARCO, 
found, with little economic support, that the practice is inefficient and held 
that a dealer subject to the maximum price constraint does suffer antitrust 
injury.58 The Court revisited maximum resale price fixing again, but not to 
resolve the apparent anomaly in its relation to the antitrust injury doctrine.59 
Rather, the Court repudiated per se treatment of it. Indeed, the Court 
indirectly sustained the anomaly by stating pointedly that the practice is not 
 
 
(condemning a tying arrangement). 
 50. If it is a price floor, the practice can and should be analyzed as minimum resale price fixing. 
See Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 123, 139 (1998) [hereinafter Blair & Lopatka, Death Becomes Her]. Whether and when 
minimum resale price fixing causes antitrust injury is discussed later in the Article. See infra notes 
177–300 and accompanying text.  
 51. For an extended analysis, see Blair & Lopatka, Death Becomes Her, supra note 50, at 151–
67; Roger D. Blair & John E. Lopatka, Albrecht Overruled—At Last, 66 ANTITRUST L. J. 537 (1998) 
[hereinafter Blair & Lopatka, Overruled]. 
 52. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 151 (1968). 
 53. 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
 54. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 341. 
 55. Id. at 335. 
 56. Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated and remanded, 522 U.S. 3 
(1997). 
 57. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 345. 
 58. Caribe BMW, Inc. v. Bayerische Motoren Werke AG, 19 F.3d 745, 752–54 (1st Cir. 1994). 
 59. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
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per se lawful,60 thereby arguably implying that the practice does cause 
antitrust injury in some cases. 
As we will see, applying an efficiency-based antitrust injury doctrine to 
RPM is not as paradoxical as is applying the doctrine to maximum resale 
price fixing. In some circumstances, RPM can reduce consumer and total 
welfare. But the doctrine must be applied carefully. Despite RPM’s status as 
per se unlawful, when a private plaintiff asserts an RPM claim for damages, 
the court must determine whether RPM can cause anticompetitive harm in 
the particular factual context alleged, and if so, whether the plaintiff’s loss 
was antitrust injury. If the court were to find antitrust injury when 
anticompetitive harm was impossible or undetectable, “antitrust injury” 
would be cut loose from its economic mooring.  
B. Antitrust Standing 
At the time the Court announced the antitrust injury doctrine, it began to 
develop the corollary principle of antitrust standing.61 In effect, the principle 
is that only those persons suffering antitrust injuries that are in some sense 
proximate to the offense are entitled to recover damages.62 The doctrine has 
an economic rationale: It restricts the universe of compensable claims to 
those that form a part of the optimal penalty, and it concentrates the right to 
recover in those who can most efficiently identify the antitrust violation and 
seek redress.63 The concept of optimality implies a standard and the 
possibility of excess. An optimal antitrust penalty can be economically 
 60. See Khan, 522 U.S. at 22. 
 61. “Antitrust standing” is distinct from constitutional standing. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. 
Gas Co., 350 F.3d 623, 627 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that unlike antitrust standing, “Article III standing 
. . . requires only injury in fact plus redressability.”). 
 62. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 
535–46 (1983). Courts and commentators use the term “antitrust standing” in conflicting ways. Some 
use the term to subsume the requirement of antitrust injury; others use it to identify prerequisites for 
suit separate from antitrust injury. See, e.g., Arroyo-Melecio v. Puerto Rican Am. Ins. Co., 398 F.3d 
56, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2005) (setting forth elements of antitrust standing); 2660 Woodley Rd. Joint 
Venture v. ITT Sheraton Corp., 369 F.3d 732, 739 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that antitrust standing and 
antitrust injury are often confused); Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1201 
(7th Cir. 1986) (observing that “[s]ome courts have considered ‘antitrust injury’ as an additional 
element of standing, while others have considered the two requirements as analytically distinct”) 
(citations omitted). What is clear is that antitrust injury is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
antitrust standing. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 110 n.5 (1986) (“A 
showing of antitrust injury is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under § 4, 
because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but may not be a proper plaintiff under § 4 for other 
reasons.”); 2660 Woodley, 369 F.3d at 739; Local Beauty Supply, 787 F.2d at 1201. See generally 11 
BAUER, supra note 34, at 3 n.14. 
 63. See Page, Scope of Liability, supra note 24, at 497–500; Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 
39, at 1484. 
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specified. It is the net harm caused by an antitrust offense to those other than 
the offenders.64 Thus, for example, a supplier to a cartel that fixes sales prices 
suffers antitrust injury as a result of reduced sales to the cartel, but those 
losses are offset by costs avoided by the cartel in reducing output. The 
Supreme Court, too, has recognized that antitrust damages imposed on a 
violator by multiple claimants can be cumulatively excessive and has 
adopted policies that avoid duplicative recoveries.65
In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois,66 the Court imposed a limitation on the 
private right to recover for antitrust violations, which is an aspect of the 
general principle of antitrust standing. The Court held that when an antitrust 
violator causes an overcharge in the price of a good, indirect purchasers—
those to whom the overcharge is passed on by other purchasers up the 
distribution chain—may not recover damages.67 Prior to Illinois Brick, the 
Court had held in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.68 that 
an antitrust violator causing an unlawful overcharge may not assert as a 
defense to an action by a direct purchaser that the plaintiff passed on the 
overcharge.69 The Court in Hanover Shoe reasoned that determining the 
effect of an overcharge on the prices charged by the direct purchaser would 
be difficult and would therefore complicate treble-damages actions.70 
Further, it believed that permitting the defense would weaken enforcement, 
for direct purchasers would be allowed to recover only a portion of the 
overcharge, and indirect purchasers, because their claims would be tiny, 
would not bother to sue.71
The Court reaffirmed and extended the reasons for rejecting defensive use 
of the pass-on theory in Illinois Brick, a decision in which the Court rejected 
offensive use of the pass-on theory. The Court reasoned that asymmetrical 
application of the pass-on theory, which prevents defendants from avoiding 
 64. See William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652, 
655–56 (1983). In a typical case of collusion, the optimal penalty equals the monopoly profits plus the 
deadweight loss. In cases of exclusion, the penalty would also include the loss in value of any market-
specific assets of the excluded firms. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Detrebling Antitrust Damages, 28 J.L. 
& ECON. 445, 465 (1985). 
 65. See supra note 23; Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (prohibiting damage claims 
by indirect purchasers in part in order to avoid the risk of duplicative recoveries). 
 66. 431 U.S. 720 (1977). 
 67. Id. at 746. 
 68. 392 U.S. 481 (1968). 
 69. Id. at 494. 
 70. Id. at 492–93. 
 71. Id. at 494. On this score, the Court was unduly pessimistic. Where state antitrust laws permit 
indirect purchasers to sue, these purchasers have not been diffident, using the class action device to 
aggregate claims. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Indirect Purchaser Suits and the Consumer 
Interest, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 531, 534 (2003). 
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liability to direct purchasers but allows indirect purchasers to recover 
damages, poses an unacceptable risk of multiple liability.72 If both plaintiffs 
and defendants were allowed to assert the theory, treble-damage litigation 
would become exceedingly complex and hence costly: elasticities of demand 
and supply would have to be estimated in order to determine the amount of 
overcharge absorbed at each distribution level.73 Unless all claimants were 
joined in one action, symmetrical application might still lead to multiple 
liability because of inconsistent judgments.74 Forcing all claimants to join in 
a single action, even if possible, would “transform treble-damages actions 
into massive multiparty litigations.”75 Further, symmetrical use of the theory 
would undermine enforcement: direct purchasers would have less incentive 
to sue if their damages were reduced by the amount of overcharge passed on, 
but indirect purchasers would still have little incentive to sue because their 
injuries are so small.76 The Court therefore concluded that, in the interests of 
simplifying treble-damage litigation and bolstering antitrust enforcement, the 
right to sue for overcharge damages should be concentrated in direct 
purchasers.77 If the right to recover was going to be concentrated, it made 
sense to concentrate the right in direct purchasers, who by virtue of their 
proximity to the violation were best situated to detect it.78
The Court in Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick recognized possible 
exceptions to the pass-on rule. Both defensive and offensive use of the theory 
might be allowed when the sales by the direct purchaser to the indirect 
purchaser are subject to a “cost-plus” contract, under which the full amount 
of the overcharge would be added to whatever price the direct purchaser 
would otherwise have charged, and the indirect purchaser would buy no less 
because of the higher price.79 Further, an exception might be made when the 
direct purchaser is owned or controlled “by its customer.”80 But the Court 
 72. See Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 730–31 (1977). 
 73. See id. at 737. Elasticities of demand and supply are notoriously difficult to estimate in 
practice. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 
1997) (“Tracing a price hike through successive resales is an example of what is called ‘incidence 
analysis,’ and is famously difficult.”).  
 74. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 737 n.18. 
 75. Id. at 740, 731 n.11. 
 76. See id. at 745. 
 77. Id. at 745–46. 
 78. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to 
Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
602, 608–09 (1979). 
 79. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736; Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery, 392 U.S. 481, 494 
(1968). See generally, Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 1717 (1990). 
 80. Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 736 n.16. The Court likely meant that an exception might apply if the 
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emphasized that exceptions to the rule would not be permitted on an 
industry-specific basis,81 and it later demonstrated its commitment to the rule 
by rejecting an exception for direct purchasers who are regulated utilities 
allowed by a state agency to increase rates in the amount of the illegal 
overcharge.82
Notably, both Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick involved allegations that 
an antitrust violator unlawfully raised price and reduced output. In Hanover 
Shoe the defendant had monopolized,83 and in Illinois Brick the defendants 
had participated in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy.84 The plaintiffs were 
purchasers of the products whose prices were inflated because of the antitrust 
violation, and they sought to recover damages on an overcharge theory. The 
rule of Illinois Brick may be limited to that context. For example, one court 
pointed out that plaintiffs might avoid the Illinois Brick bar by casting their 
price-fixing claim for overcharge damages as a boycott claim for lost 
profits.85 As we will see, because RPM usually does not involve an output 
restriction and a price set above the competitive level, the application of 
Illinois Brick to RPM is problematic.86  
C. Estimating Damages 
Long before the Court held that only certain types of injuries are 
compensable under the antitrust laws, it recognized that an antitrust plaintiff 
seeking damages has to prove with reasonable certainty that the violation in 
fact caused the plaintiff an injury.87 The Court held that the fact-finder may 
conclude as a matter of just and reasonable inference from the proof of 
defendants’ wrongful acts and their tendency to injure plaintiffs’ 
 
 
direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its supplier, the antitrust violator. The cases cited by the 
Court for general support dealt with an argument that an antitrust violator is insulated from liability by 
dealing directly with an intermediary the violator owned or controlled. See Perkins v. Standard Oil Co. 
of Cal., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969); In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Western Liquid Asphalt 
Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 199 (9th Cir. 1973). Cf. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 
123 F.3d 599, 605 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting that the exception for a direct purchaser owned or controlled 
by its customer presumably also applies “vice versa”). 
 81. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 743–44. 
 82. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990).  
 83. See Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 483. 
 84. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 727. 
 85. In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs, 123 F.3d at 606. 
 86. See infra notes 219–30, 238–47 and accompanying text. 
 87. See Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946); Story Parchment Co. v. 
Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 561–66 (1931). See also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine 
Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 n.9, 123–24 (1969); Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696–702, 697 n.7 (1962). See generally PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES 31–35 
(William H. Page ed., 1996). 
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business, and from the evidence of the decline in prices, profits and 
values, not shown to be attributable to other causes, that defendants’ 
wrongful acts had caused damage to the plaintiffs.88  
The Court also recognized, however, that plaintiffs often cannot prove the 
amount of damages suffered as confidently as they can prove the fact of 
injury. “The vagaries of the marketplace usually deny us sure knowledge of 
what plaintiff’s situation would have been in the absence of the defendant’s 
antitrust violation.”89 Moreover, “a defendant whose wrongful conduct has 
rendered difficult the ascertainment of the precise damages suffered by the 
plaintiff, is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured with the 
same exactness and precision as would otherwise be possible.”90 Therefore, 
the standard of proof for establishing damages is less demanding than the 
standard of proof for establishing injury in fact.91 Nevertheless, the plaintiff’s 
calculation of damages cannot be speculative.92 It must be based on a 
reasonable theory of recovery and be supported by relevant, available data.93 
A closely related doctrine is that a plaintiff generally must prove the amount 
 88. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264. 
 89. J. Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 566–67 (1981). 
 90. Eastman Kodak Co. v. S. Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359, 379 (1927). 
 91. For example, in Story Parchment, 282 U.S. at 562, the Court observed: 
It is true that there was uncertainty as to the extent of the damage, but there was none as to the fact 
of damage; and there is a clear distinction between the measure of proof necessary to establish the 
fact that petitioner had sustained some damage, and the measure of proof necessary to enable the 
jury to fix the amount. 
See also New York v. Julius Nasso Concrete Corp., 202 F.3d 82, 88 (2d Cir. 2000) (recognizing that 
burden of proof in establishing amount of antitrust damages is less rigorous than burden in establishing 
fact of injury or amount of damages in non-antitrust cases); Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative 
Serv., Inc. 773 F.2d 1506, 1509 (9th Cir. 1985) (noting that “evidence linking the alleged violation of 
the antitrust laws to [plaintiff’s] injury must be more precise than the evidence establishing the amount 
of injury which it has suffered”). See generally 11 BAUER, supra note 34, at 12 (noting that once the 
plaintiff proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it suffered an injury in fact as a result of the 
defendant’s antitrust violation, “a far lower threshold is placed on the degree of certainty of proof 
regarding the extent, or dollar value,” of the injury). 
 92. See, e.g., Bonjorno v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 752 F.2d 802, 813 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(noting that the damages claimed by an antitrust plaintiff may not be “based upon speculation or 
guesswork”); Kestenbaum v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 514 F.2d 690, 695 (5th Cir. 1975) (“We 
recognize that leniency should be permitted in showing damages in private antitrust actions, however, 
a damage assessment based wholly on speculation and guesswork is improper.”). 
 93. See, e.g., McGlinchy v. Shell Chem. Co., 845 F.2d 802, 808 (9th Cir. 1988); Multiflex, Inc. 
v. Samuel Moore & Co., 709 F.2d 980, 995 (5th Cir. 1983); Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 59 
n.19 (2d Cir. 1980); Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 46 (5th Cir. 1972); ILC Peripherals 
Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 436 (N.D. Cal. 1978), aff’d sub nom. Memorex Corp. 
v. IBM Corp., 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally Roger D. Blair & William H. Page, 
“Speculative” Antitrust Damages, 70 WASH. L. REV. 423, 427 (1995) (arguing that “a projection is 
‘speculative’ if it fails to account rationally for factors other than the defendant’s illegal conduct that 
may have caused (or significantly contributed to) the asserted difference between” the plaintiff’s actual 
and but-for conditions). 
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of damages caused by each alleged anticompetitive act.94 Under this so-
called disaggregation rule, the plaintiff cannot recover for losses that are 
found not to flow from anticompetitive conduct. Both of these doctrines help 
to insure that the plaintiff’s cognizable antitrust loss, as measured coherently, 
is caused by the antitrust violation.95 As demonstrated below, when 
consumers complain about RPM, their calculation of damages can be 
hopelessly speculative and impermissibly aggregated. 
III. ANTITRUST POLICY REGARDING RPM
The judicial analysis of RPM went wrong from the outset and has never 
recovered. When the Court first held in Dr. Miles96 that RPM is illegal per 
se,97 it had not adopted wealth maximization as the fundamental norm of 
 94. See, e.g., Infusion Res., Inc. v. Minimed, Inc., 351 F.3d 688, 696 (5th Cir. 2003) (recognizing 
that the disaggregation requirement applies to antitrust actions); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick 
Corp., 207 F.3d 1039, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (setting aside a jury verdict on damages because the jury 
was not required to segregate losses caused by different alleged antitrust violations); Spray-Rite Serv. 
Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 1243 (7th Cir. 1982) (noting that an antitrust plaintiff generally 
must “disaggregate the damage sum and apportion the amount of damage caused by each of [the 
challenged] business practices”), aff’d, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); S. Pac. Communications Co. v. AT&T 
Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 1090 (D.D.C. 1983) (“The trier of fact must be able to determine from the 
damage evidence whether each of the particular actions alleged to form an antitrust violation 
‘materially contributed’ to plaintiffs’ injury.”); Northeastern Tel. Co. v. AT&T Co., 497 F. Supp. 230, 
247–48 (D. Conn. 1980) (noting that absent proof of “the amount of damages flowing from each 
separate area of anticompetitive conduct,” the factfinder would not have “a rational basis on which to 
correlate the damages to the particular conduct found to be predatory or anticompetitive”), rev’d on 
other grounds, 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981). See generally M. Sean Royall, Disaggregation of Antitrust 
Damages, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 311 (1997); James R. McCall, The Disaggregation of Damages 
Requirement in Private Monopolization Actions, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 643 (1987). 
 95. Causation is a requirement in any private antitrust action. See, e.g., Bell Atl. Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 339 F.3d 294, 302 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Establishing causation, or ‘fact of damage,’ requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate a causal connection between the specific antitrust violation at issue and an 
injury to the business or property of the antitrust plaintiff.”); Concord Boat Corp. v. Brunswick Corp., 
207 F.3d 1039, 1054–55 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that “[a]ntitrust injury, causation, and damages all are 
necessary parts of the [plaintiff’s] proof”); Argus Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 801 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 
1986) (noting that “lack of causation in fact is fatal to the merits of any antitrust claim”). Of course, 
Brunswick establishes that not just any injury to business or property will suffice, but rather the 
relevant injury is an antitrust injury. 
 96. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 97. The Court did not use the per se terminology, which is not surprising because the explicit 
distinction between the rule of reason and per se illegality did not begin to emerge until Standard Oil 
Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), decided in the same year. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, 
supra note 6, at 277; E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST 
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 121–22 (3d ed. 1998). But the Court’s analysis was tantamount to 
per se treatment. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408. Commentators overwhelmingly trace the per se 
treatment of RPM to Dr. Miles. See, e.g., HYLTON, supra note 6, at 254 (indicating that the Court’s 
ruling established the per se illegality of RPM); HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 451; SULLIVAN & 
HARRISON, supra, at 219. Likewise, in subsequent RPM cases, the Court has indicated that Dr. Miles 
established per se illegality. See, e.g., Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 724 
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antitrust, but even so, its economic analysis of the practice was flawed. In 
subsequent cases, after it had grounded antitrust in efficiency, it refused to 
correct its mistakes in economic analysis. Out of allegiance to stare decisis, a 
desire to thwart legislative intervention,98 or sheer stubbornness, the Court 
maintained the per se rule. But in tacit recognition that the per se illegality of 
RPM lacked an economic foundation, it adopted doctrines to minimize the 
rule’s harm. We briefly trace that history here. 
A. The Foundation: Dr. Miles 
The antitrust treatment of vertical price restraints began with a private 
dispute between Dr. Miles Medical Company, a manufacturer of proprietary 
medicines, and John D. Park & Sons (“Park”), a wholesale druggist.99 Dr. 
Miles entered into contracts with wholesale and retail drug firms that 
specified minimum resale prices for its proprietary medicines.100 The 
wholesalers were obligated to sell only to other wholesalers or retailers 
approved by Dr. Miles, which were those who also had entered into the 
contracts.101 Park refused to sign a contract and instead purchased Dr. Miles’ 
medicines from other wholesale and retail dealers through allegedly “false 
and fraudulent representations,” thereby inducing the “authorized” dealers to 
violate their contractual obligations.102 Park sold these medicines at 
discounted prices. Dr. Miles filed a complaint against Park alleging that the 
defendant had “maliciously interfere[d]” with the contracts between Dr. 
 
 
(1988); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 (1984). 
 98. One explanation of the Court’s unwillingness to repudiate the per se illegality of RPM is that 
political forces were intent upon retaining the status of the practice, and the Court wanted to head off 
an anticipated statutory amendment declaring RPM illegal per se. See generally BORK, supra note 8, at 
436 (opining that it is perhaps “just as well” that the Court retain the misguided rule of per se illegality 
because “if the Court were to legalize resale price maintenance, Congress, at the instance of organized 
retail discounters who do not like competition from other modes of distribution, might well freeze the 
rule of per se illegality in the law by statute”); Richard E. Day, Dealer Terminations and Resale Price 
Maintenance: Paradox Revisited, 40 S.C. L. REV. 339, 374 (1989) (speculating that the Court is 
unlikely to overrule Dr. Miles in light of potential action by Congress to codify the per se rule against 
RPM agreements); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next One Hundred Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817, 
831 (1987) (speculating that Congress would codify the rule of per se illegality were the Court to 
overturn Dr. Miles). In fact, a number of bills to codify the per se rule against RPM agreements were 
introduced in Congress even though the Court did not overrule Dr. Miles, but none was successful. See 
generally Margaret A. Dillenburg, Note, The Dr. Miles Doctrine and Vertical Per Se Rules: Business 
Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 111, 128, 128 n.115 (1989) 
(listing several bills). 
 99. See Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 394. 
 100. See id.  
 101. See id. at 396–98. 
 102. Id. at 382. 
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Miles and some of its customers.103 Park responded that the contracts were 
invalid as against public policy because they violated the antitrust laws.104
The Court identified “the validity of the restrictive agreements” as the 
central question for review.105 In support of its agreements, Dr. Miles argued 
that: (1) the proprietary nature of its medicines conferred upon it the right to 
exert extensive control; and (2) irrespective of the proprietary nature of its 
medicines, “a manufacturer is entitled to control the prices on all sales of his 
own product.”106 The Court rejected both arguments, emphasizing the 
importance of an individual dealer’s freedom to trade in promoting the public 
interest. For example, to Dr. Miles’ first argument, the Court responded: 
[This argument] implies that, if for any reason monopoly of 
production exists, it carries with it the right to control the entire trade 
of the produced article, and to prevent any competition that otherwise 
might arise between wholesale and retail dealers. . . . But, because 
there is monopoly of production, it certainly cannot be said that there 
is no public interest in maintaining freedom of trade with respect to 
future sales after the article has been placed on the market and the 
producer has parted with his title.107
Just why the Court believed that the public interest is served by ensuring 
“freedom of trade” is not entirely clear. The Court seemed to believe that the 
protection of dealers from restrictions on the way they disposed of their 
property was a value in itself.108 But it also equated freedom of pricing by 
dealers with enhanced consumer welfare. The Court stated: “The 
complainant having sold its product at prices satisfactory to itself, the public 
 103. Id. at 394. 
 104. See id. at 392–93. 
 105. Id. at 395. 
 106. Id. at 400. Hylton offers an ex post economic rationalization for the Court’s dismissal of 
these arguments. See HYLTON, supra note 6, at 254–57.  
 107. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 403. This reflects a misunderstanding of vertical integration and 
control. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 30, at 295–301. If there were monopoly in production, 
downstream control of resale prices would foster consumer welfare. 
 108. For example, Peritz argues that the decision was more heavily influenced by common law 
concerns with the allocation and exercise of property rights than with efficiency or consumer welfare. 
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 516–27 (1989). 
See also Alan H. Silberman, Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, 1180 PLI/Corp. 
821, 869–70 (2000) (“[T]he Court was concerned with maximizing the individual decisional freedom 
of participants in the distribution chain as a matter of liberty, rather than considered economic 
judgment.”). Limiting the ability of distributors to make independent pricing decisions appears to have 
concerned the Court years later in its treatment of consignment sales as well. See Simpson v. Union 
Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13, 16 (1964) (holding that an agreement setting the price to be charged by 
independent consignees for a fungible product is illegal per se).  
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is entitled to whatever advantage may be derived from competition in the 
subsequent traffic.”109  
According to Dr. Miles, the source of its injury lay in the use of its 
products as loss leaders by Park: The discounted prices were employed “‘to 
thus attract and secure custom and patronage for other merchandise, and not 
for the purpose of making or receiving a direct money profit’ from the sales 
of the remedies.”110 Dr. Miles argued that most retail druggists were unable 
to earn “sufficient profits” on its medicines at the discounted price.111 As a 
result, some dealers no longer stocked Dr. Miles’ medicines, and those that 
did promoted rival brands more heavily, to the detriment of Dr. Miles.112 
Consequently, Dr. Miles argued that Park’s discounting injured its business 
by harming the reputation of its products and thereby decreasing its overall 
sales.113
The Court was unconvinced that Dr. Miles was injured by Park’s price 
cutting, but it was also unable to explain how Dr. Miles profited from resale 
price controls. Instead, it asserted that the benefits of the restrictive 
agreements accrued to the dealers, not Dr. Miles.114 The Court observed that 
“the advantage of established retail prices primarily concerns the dealers. The 
enlarged profits which would result from adherence to the established rates 
would go to them, and not to the complainant.”115 Because the Court 
believed that the benefits of resale price constraints inured to the dealers, it 
could equate Dr. Miles’ vertical restraints to a per se illegal horizontal 
combination among the dealers:116 “[T]he complainant can fare no better 
with its plan of identical contracts than could the dealers themselves if they 
formed a combination and endeavored to establish the same restrictions, and 
thus to achieve the same result, by agreement with each other.”117 The irony 
 109. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 409.  
 110. Id. at 381–82 (quoting Dr. Miles’ complaint). 
 111. Id. at 375 (quoting Dr. Miles’ complaint). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 407. This statement may be a vague allusion to a dealer cartel as the motivation for Dr. 
Miles’ RPM plan. But the Court did not offer any reason why Dr. Miles went to court to protect those 
benefits on behalf of its dealers.  
 115. Id. 
 116. Pitofsky makes the same mistake. See Robert Pitofsky, In Defense of Discounters: The No-
Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, 71 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1490 (1983). He also 
appears to prefer per se rules because “it is very difficult for a plaintiff . . . to win a rule of reason 
case.” Id. at 1489. If true, this suggests that plaintiffs must be filing weak—if not frivolous—cases. 
 117. Dr. Miles, 220 U.S. at 408. Thus, the Court confused horizontal and vertical restraints, a 
mistake that lasted for more than half a century until the decision in Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).  
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is that, if RPM agreements are tantamount to a dealers’ cartel, prohibiting 
RPM cannot benefit both dealers and consumers.  
Notably, the Court offered no economic analysis to support its conclusion 
that the effects of the vertical restraints in question were identical to the 
effects of a dealer cartel. Professor Hovenkamp has argued that “the Dr. 
Miles decision first condemning RPM was the byproduct of one of the 
biggest cartels in American history—an agreement by members of national 
associations of wholesale and retail druggists to fix the price of proprietary 
medical drugs” and that “RPM was clearly being used to facilitate horizontal 
collusion.”118 Moreover, the Court may have been aware of the cartel. First, 
Justice Lurton, who was on the Supreme Court when it considered Dr. Miles 
(though he played no part in the decision), wrote an earlier decision while on 
the Sixth Circuit addressing a portion of the cartel.119 Second, the cartel was 
well documented in the literature and in the case law.120 But the fact remains 
that the Court never explicitly identified a cartel and did not address the 
theoretical possibility of using RPM as a facilitating device for a retailer 
cartel.121 In the end, the Court provided no substantial economic rationale for 
condemning RPM in Dr. Miles, and therefore no basis to distinguish future 
welfare-enhancing instances of RPM from welfare-reducing ones. 
Once the Court found that agreements to engage in RPM are illegal per 
se, efficiency justifications for the practice were generally not raised or 
considered in subsequent cases. Rather, litigants and courts focused primarily 
on whether an “agreement” existed.122 If there is an agreement, RPM is 
illegal per se; if there is no agreement, there is no violation.123
 118. HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 451 (citation omitted), 471 n.1. 
 119. See John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907). 
 120. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937, ch. 25 (1991); 
Brown & Allen v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co., 41 S.E. 553 (Ga. 1902); Hartman v. John D. Park & Sons 
Co., 145 F. 358, 380 (C.C.E.D. Ky. 1906), rev’d, 153 F. 24 (6th Cir. 1907); Klingel’s Pharmacy of 
Baltimore City v. Sharp & Dohme, 64 A. 1029 (Md. 1906); Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. Jaynes Drug Co., 
149 F. 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1906); John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Nat’l Wholesale Druggists Ass’n, 67 
N.E. 136, 137 (N.Y. 1903); Loder v. Jayne, 142 F. 1010, 1014 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1906), rev’d on other 
grounds, 149 F. 21 (3d Cir. 1906). 
 121. Posner also notes that the Court did not find the presence of a dealer cartel. POSNER, supra 
note 3, at 177. 
 122. See William Breit, Resale Price Maintenance: What Do Economists Know and When Did 
They Know It?, 147 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 72, 77 (1991). 
 123. See, e.g., DeLong Equip. Co. v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 1186, 
1189 (11th Cir. 1993) (“Resale price maintenance agreements are, of course, per se illegal restraints of 
trade within § 1 of the [Sherman] Act. Absent such per se illegality here, defendants concededly would 
prevail.”). 
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B. “Agreement” and Colgate 
Eight years after Dr. Miles, the Court revisited RPM in United States v. 
Colgate.124 Relying on Dr. Miles, the government charged Colgate with 
engaging in an unlawful combination with its wholesalers and retailers to fix 
resale prices.125 Section 1 of the Sherman Act outlaws only agreements in 
restraint of trade,126 and the Court’s analysis turned on what, precisely, 
constitutes an agreement.127 Among the methods used to encourage 
compliance with the specified resale prices, Colgate (1) issued various 
communications to its dealers indicating the uniform prices to be charged, (2) 
refused to deal with those dealers who did not adhere to these price 
schedules, (3) conducted investigations to discover who was and was not 
charging the specified prices, and (4) requested assurances from non-
complying dealers for future compliance with the price lists.128 Unlike Dr. 
Miles, however, Colgate did not require its dealers to sign written contracts 
signifying an agreement to comply with the pricing schedules. The Court 
found the distinction significant, noting that in Dr. Miles, “the unlawful 
combination was effected through contracts which undertook to prevent 
dealers from freely exercising the right to sell.”129 The Court’s concern with 
dealers’ freedom to trade130 once again factored prominently into its decision: 
The retailer after buying, could, if he chose, give away his purchase, 
or sell it at any price he saw fit, or not sell it at all; his course in these 
respects being affected only by the fact that he might by his action 
 124. 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 
 125. Id. at 302. 
 126. Literally, Section 1 proscribes “[e]very contract, combination . . . , or conspiracy” in restraint 
of trade. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). Courts do not distinguish among the words, however. See, e.g., In re 
Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 117 n.3 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The phrase ‘concerted action’ is 
often used as shorthand for any form of activity meeting the Section 1 ‘contract . . . combination or 
conspiracy’ requirement.” (internal citations omitted)); POSNER, supra note 3, at 262 (“[T]he courts 
sensibly have not worried about whether the terms ‘contract,’ ‘combination,’ and ‘conspiracy,’ in 
section 1, have nonoverlapping meanings.”). What is required is an agreement, or “concerted action,” 
which has become a term of art in antitrust law. See, e.g., Virginia Vermiculite, Ltd. v. Historic Green 
Springs, Inc., 307 F.3d 277, 281 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that “courts must treat [the phrase ‘concerted 
action’] as a term of art in the context of the Sherman Act”). 
 127. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 306–07. 
 128. Id. at 303. 
 129. Id. at 307–08. 
 130. The Court commented: “The purpose of the Sherman Act is to prohibit monopolies, contracts 
and combinations which probably would unduly interfere with the free exercise of their rights by those 
engaged, or who wish to engage, in trade and commerce—in a word to preserve the right of freedom to 
trade.” Id. at 307. 
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incur the displeasure of the manufacturer, who could refuse to make 
further sales to him, as he had the undoubted right to do.131  
The Court, deferring to the trial court’s interpretation, concluded that “the 
indictment does not charge Colgate & Company with selling its products to 
dealers under agreements which obligated the latter not to resell except at 
prices fixed by the company.”132 Consequently, the government had failed to 
allege the requisite “agreement” for a Section 1 violation. In addition, the 
Court commented on a manufacturer’s right to make unilateral decisions 
about the terms on which it will deal with others: 
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the 
[Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of trader or 
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to 
exercise his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he 
will deal. And, of course, he may announce in advance the 
circumstances under which he will refuse to sell.133
Thus, Colgate stands for the proposition that a manufacturer may (1) 
announce the prices and terms on which it will deal and (2) refuse to deal 
with those who do not comply with those terms—as long as those decisions 
are made unilaterally.  
The Colgate decision unquestionably conflicts with Dr. Miles on 
economic grounds, and the tension between the two decisions is evident in 
the Court’s subsequent attempts to clarify precisely what constitutes 
agreement. During the decades immediately following Colgate, the Court 
 131. Id. at 306. 
 132. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). Some courts subsequently interpreted the language in Colgate to 
mean that express contracts or written agreements were required to find the “agreement” necessary for 
a Sherman Act violation. See, e.g., United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85, 99 (1920) 
(indicating that “[t]he court below misapprehended the meaning and effect of the opinion and 
judgment in [Colgate]”); Frey & Son, Inc. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208, 210 (1921) 
(commenting that Colgate “was misapprehended”). This interpretation is understandable given the 
language in Colgate. For example, the Court quotes the following passage from the trial court’s 
opinion: “The pregnant fact should never be lost sight of that no averment is made of any contract or 
agreement having been entered into whereby the defendant, the manufacturer, and his customers, 
bound themselves to enhance and maintain prices . . . .” Colgate, 250 U.S. at 305 (emphasis added) 
(quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 253 F. 522, 527 (D.C. Va. 1918)). But in both Schrader’s and 
Frey, the Court clarified that there is an unlawful combination when a manufacturer enters into 
agreements, “whether express or implied,” with its customers. See Schrader’s, 252 U.S. at 99 
(indicating that there is an unlawful combination when a manufacturer enters “into agreements—
whether express or implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances—with [its] customers”); 
Frey, 256 U.S. at 210 (reiterating its ruling in Schrader’s that “the essential agreement, combination or 
conspiracy might be implied from a course of dealing or other circumstances”). 
 133. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307. 
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narrowed the scope of Colgate and commensurately expanded the scope of 
RPM per se illegality.134 A seller intent upon restricting the resale prices of 
its customers could avoid liability only by simply refusing to deal with those 
who refuse to charge suggested resale prices.135 Thus, in United States v. 
Parke, Davis & Co.,136 the Court held that a manufacturer exceeds the 
protection of Colgate if it refuses to deal with wholesalers who sell to 
retailers who fail to adhere to suggested retail prices or if it attempts to 
persuade resellers to comply. It declared: 
[W]hatever uncertainty previously existed as to the scope of the 
Colgate doctrine, . . . an unlawful combination is not just such as 
arises from a price maintenance agreement, express or implied; such a 
combination is also organized if the producer secures adherence to his 
suggested prices by means which go beyond his mere declination to 
sell to a customer who will not observe his announced policy. . . .  
 When the manufacturer’s actions . . . go beyond mere 
announcement of his policy and the simple refusal to deal, and he 
employs other means which effect adherence to his resale prices, . . . 
he has put together a combination in violation of the Sherman Act.137
Together, Colgate and Parke, Davis provide no guidance to private 
plaintiffs regarding antitrust injury and damages. They also reveal the 
economic incoherence of RPM law. From the standpoint of consumer or 
economic welfare, it makes no difference whether minimum resale prices are 
secured through express agreements or through a series of “unilateral” 
actions that communicate just as effectively. The economic effects are 
precisely the same.138 But from a legal standpoint, this distinction is critical. 
 134. The Court did open up one additional avenue for circumventing Dr. Miles, holding that resale 
price maintenance provisions in consignment agreements were not per se illegal. See United States v. 
Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). However, the Court all but closed this avenue in Simpson v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (holding that minimum resale price constraints in 
consignment contracts are illegal per se). 
 135. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960); United States v. Bausch 
& Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944); FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922); 
United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 252 U.S. 85 (1920). In Parke, Davis, the Court observed that 
Beech-Nut and Bausch & Lomb “teach that judicial inquiry is not to stop with a search of the record for 
evidence of purely contractual arrangements.” Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 44. 
 136. 362 U.S. 29 (1960). 
 137. Parke, Davis, 362 U.S. at 43–44. 
 138. Indeed, this did not go unnoticed by all federal judges. In Schrader’s, the district court judge 
opined: 
Personally, and with all due respect, . . . I can see no real difference upon the facts between the Dr. 
Miles Company Case and the Colgate Company Case. The only difference is that in the former the 
arrangement for marketing its product was put in writing, whereas in the latter the wholesale and 
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Because vertical price restraints fall under the per se rule, once agreement is 
established, the defendant’s case crumbles. The disparate legal consequences 
predictably result in extraordinary efforts by defendants to prove that their 
conduct was unilateral, and conversely by plaintiffs to prove an “agreement.” 
C. Proof of Agreement: Monsanto and Business Electronics 
In its most recent RPM decisions, the Court reaffirmed the principle that 
agreement is a necessary element of a Section 1 offense, but it made the 
requisite agreement more difficult to prove. In Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite 
Serv. Corp.,139 the plaintiff, Spray-Rite, was a wholesale distributor of 
agricultural chemical products, including herbicides manufactured by 
Monsanto.140 After an eleven-year distribution relationship, Monsanto 
refused to renew Spray-Rite’s distributorship.141 Spray-Rite subsequently 
filed suit against Monsanto, alleging that the termination was pursuant to a 
conspiracy between Monsanto and its other distributors to fix resale prices.142 
Though the Court ultimately found in favor of Spray-Rite, it disagreed with 
the proposition that proof of conspiracy could be inferred simply from the 
termination of “a price-cutting distributor in response to or following 
complaints by other distributors.”143 The Court then clarified the appropriate 
standard of proof for finding unlawful collaboration: 
There must be evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the 
manufacturer and nonterminated distributors were acting 
independently. . . . [T]he antitrust plaintiff should present direct or 
 
 
retail dealers observed the prices fixed by the vendor. This is a distinction without a difference. 
The tacit acquiescence of the wholesalers and retailers in the prices thus fixed is the equivalent for 
all practical purposes of an express agreement. 
Shrader’s, 252 U.S. at 97 (quoting United States v. A. Schrader’s Son, Inc., 264 F. 175, 183 (N.D. 
Ohio 1919) (alteration in original)). The Court of Appeals expressed similar difficulty in 
distinguishing Dr. Miles and Colgate in Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. FTC, 264 F. 885, 889 (1920), rev’d, 
257 U.S. 441 (1922): “It is difficult to say why a different conclusion should be reached, if the same 
result is attained by acquiescence and co-operation without express agreement between the 
manufacturer and his purchasers severally.” 
 139. 465 U.S. 752 (1984). See generally David F. Shores, Narrowing the Sherman Act Through an 
Extension of Colgate: The Matsushita Case, 55 TENN. L. REV. 261 (1988) (arguing that the Court in 
Monsanto and Matsushita narrowed the concept of an antitrust agreement and criticizing the 
decisions); Wesley J. Liebeler, 1983 Economic Review of Antitrust Developments: The Distinction 
Between Price and Nonprice Distribution Restraints, 31 UCLA L. REV. 384 (1983); Robert W. 
Beattie, Note, The Procrustean Approach Remains: Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 10 
DEL J. CORP. LAW 733 (1985). 
 140. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 756. 
 141. Id. at 756–57. 
 142. Id. at 757. 
 143. Id. at 759. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p657 Blair Herndon Lopatka book pages.doc 12/7/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
682 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:657 
 
 
 
 
 
 
circumstantial evidence that reasonably tends to prove that the 
manufacturer and others “had a conscious commitment to a common 
scheme designed to achieve an unlawful objective.”144
The Court observed that though unilateral and concerted vertical price 
setting are legally distinguishable, the economic effects may be identical.145 
Citing its earlier Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.146 decision, the 
Court noted, however, that there are legitimate and procompetitive reasons 
for a manufacturer and distributor to discuss prices and that such discussions 
do not, by themselves, indicate the presence of concerted action.147 
Consequently, the Court expressed its concern that “[p]ermitting an 
agreement to be inferred merely from the existence of complaints . . . could 
deter or penalize perfectly legitimate conduct.”148 Monsanto thus places a 
heavy evidentiary burden on plaintiffs in RPM cases.149
In Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp.,150 the Court 
edged further away from its earlier hostility toward RPM. It held that a per se 
illegal vertical price restraint cannot be found without an explicit agreement 
on price, even if a manufacturer and a dealer agree that the manufacturer will 
stop doing business with a rival dealer for failure to adhere to suggested 
resale prices.151 Business Electronics was a distributor of Sharp Electronics 
products in Houston.152 A second distributor, Hartwell, was approved by 
Sharp for the Houston market.153 Though Sharp published a list of suggested 
minimum retail prices, there were no explicit agreements of the Colgate 
variety requiring that the distributors adhere to those prices.154 Hartwell 
priced below the suggested retail prices at least occasionally.155 Business 
 144. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (other citations omitted)). 
 145. Specifically, the Court observed: “[T]he economic effect of all of the conduct described 
above—unilateral and concerted vertical price setting, agreements on price and nonprice restrictions—
is in many, but not all, cases similar or identical.” Id. at 762 (citations omitted). Though the Court was 
invited to reconsider the per se treatment of vertical price restraints in Monsanto, it declined to do so. 
Id. at 761 n.7. 
 146. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
 147. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 762–63. 
 148. Id. at 763. 
 149. For an example of the burden borne by plaintiffs, see Jeanery, Inc. v. James Jeans, Inc., 849 
F.2d 1148, 1156–61 (9th Cir. 1988) (finding evidence insufficient to support a jury verdict in favor of 
a dealer alleging that manufacturer and other dealers conspired to fix minimum resale prices). 
 150. 485 U.S. 717 (1988). 
 151. Id. at 726–27. 
 152. Id. at 721. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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Electronics not only did so frequently, it also priced below Hartwell.156 
Hartwell complained about Business Electronics’ price discounts and 
eventually presented Sharp with an ultimatum: terminate Business 
Electronics or Hartwell would cease distributing Sharp products.157 
Following its termination, Business Electronics brought suit against Sharp 
alleging that Sharp and Hartwell had conspired to terminate it and that this 
conspiracy constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.158 The jury 
found that Sharp and Hartwell did agree to the termination of Business 
Electronics’s distributorship.159 The Court granted certiorari to determine 
whether an agreement between a manufacturer and a distributor to terminate 
a second “price cutting” distributor was sufficiently likely to result in 
anticompetitive effects that it should be deemed illegal per se.160 The Court 
held that without an actual agreement on price, such an agreement did not 
warrant per se treatment.161  
Although the Court can rightly be criticized for lapsing “into formalistic 
line drawing,”162 its decision was consistent with Colgate. Certainly an 
agreement to terminate a price cutter implies that the surviving dealer will 
not cut price. But a strong likelihood that resale prices will correspond to a 
price floor set by the manufacturer does not establish an agreement; a 
practice of setting suggested resale prices and refusing to sell to dealers who 
do not adhere to them is also likely to result in actual prices that correspond 
to the suggested prices, yet Colgate held that such conduct does not 
constitute an RPM agreement. The agreement to terminate the price cutter 
does not supply the necessary element of an agreement on resale prices, even 
if supported by further evidence that the remaining dealers are charging the 
suggested resale prices.  
Significantly, the Court reasoned that RPM agreements are illegal per se 
“because they ‘facilitate cartelizing.’”163 Of course, the capacity of a practice 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 722. 
 160. Id. at 720. 
 161. The Court stated: “There has been no showing here that an agreement between a 
manufacturer and a dealer to terminate a ‘price cutter,’ without a further agreement on the price or 
price levels to be charged by the remaining dealer, almost always tends to restrict competition and 
reduce output.” Id. at 726–27. 
 162. Wesley J. Liebler, Resale Price Maintenance and Consumer Welfare: Business Electronics 
Corp. v. Sharp Electonics Corp., 36 UCLA L. REV. 889, 906 (1989). 
 163. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 725 (quoting Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 1, 36, 51 
n.18 (quoting, in turn, Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the 
Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 
282, 294 (1975))). 
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to produce anticompetitive effects is not enough to justify per se illegality, 
and the Court correctly implied that per se condemnation is inappropriate 
unless a practice “almost always tends to restrict competition and reduce 
output.”164 But nowhere did the Court cite any evidence that RPM 
agreements “almost always” facilitate cartelizing. Rather, the Court held that 
an agreement to terminate a price cutter, by itself, does not almost always 
have anticompetitive effects.165 The Court was skeptical that either a 
manufacturer cartel or a retailer cartel could be established or maintained in 
the absence of an explicit agreement on price. Moreover, the Court was 
concerned that a finding of per se illegality would subject manufacturers to 
greater liability by increasing the likelihood that the implementation of 
vertical nonprice restraints would be “attacked as designed to allow existing 
dealers to charge higher prices.”166 The Court found that “[i]n the vast 
majority of cases, it will be extremely difficult for the manufacturer to 
convince a jury that its motivation was to ensure adequate services, since 
price cutting and some measure of service cutting usually go hand in 
hand.”167 As a result, “[m]anufacturers would be likely to forgo legitimate 
and competitively useful conduct rather than risk treble damages and perhaps 
even criminal penalties.”168
D. The Continuing Legacy of Dr. Miles  
Although Monsanto and Business Electronics make it more difficult for 
plaintiffs to prove the fact of an unlawful agreement, RPM agreements, once 
found, remain per se illegal. Recent cases, brought by both the antitrust 
enforcement agencies and private plaintiffs, demonstrate the continuing 
vitality of the per se rule with a Colgate exception.169 In recent years, public 
 164. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 726–27 (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 728. Such a claim was made in Ezzo’s Invs., Inc. v. Royal Beauty Supply, Inc., 243 F.3d 
980 (6th Cir. 2001), which involved a vertical distribution restraint by Matrix Essentials, a 
manufacturer of hair care products. The restraint at issue was Matrix’s policy of allowing its hair care 
products to be sold only by salons that derived more than 50 percent of their revenue from hair-care 
services (as opposed to product sales). The plaintiff beauty salon, Ezzo’s, argued that this policy was 
simply a pretext for vertical price fixing. Relying on Business Electronics, the Sixth Circuit found that 
the district court appropriately applied a rule of reason analysis to the “50 percent rule” because there 
was no evidence of an agreement on price. Id. at 985. 
 167. Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 727–28. By this time, the Court was obviously aware of the 
procompetitive effects of vertical restraints (which we examine in the next Section), but continued to 
treat price and nonprice restraints differently even though the economic effects may be identical. 
 168. Id. at 728. 
 169. Keds and Reebok both signed consent orders with the FTC and settled companion parens 
patriae suits with the fifty states plus the District of Columbia. See, e.g., New York ex rel. Vacco v. 
Reebok Int’l Ltd., 903 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); New York ex rel. Koppell v. Keds Corp., No. 93 
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enforcement and private enforcement efforts appear to have gone hand-in-
hand. Some of these efforts also stimulated separate class action lawsuits.170 
None of these cases sheds new light on the economic concerns with RPM. 
As we illustrate in the next Section, there are procompetitive as well as 
anticompetitive explanations for RPM, and sorting out the economic effects 
will prove difficult for private plaintiffs.  
IV. PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT: PROBLEMS OF PROOF 
To recover treble damages, a private plaintiff must prove the antitrust 
violation, the existence of antitrust injury and antitrust standing, and, through 
reliable methodology, the amount of damages sustained.171 Often courts can 
resolve a case most expeditiously by addressing the issue of antitrust injury 
or standing first, using the two requirements as litigation screens. If the 
plaintiff is disqualified on one of these grounds, the court need not resolve 
liability issues or evaluate the damages calculation. As demonstrated in the 
last Section,172 unlawful RPM requires a finding of an agreement within the 
technical definition of the law, and the existence of such an agreement may 
be hotly disputed. Damage calculations, which are fact-intensive, tend to be 
more difficult to assess than assertions of antitrust injury and standing, which 
are more theoretical in nature. For example, in ARCO,173 the Court assumed 
that maximum vertical price fixing was illegal per se,174 then concluded that 
a competitor of a dealer bound by a non-predatory maximum price constraint 
suffers no antitrust injury.175 The Court was not required to consider liability 
issues or the reasonableness of the plaintiff’s damage calculation. Of course, 
if the plaintiff suffered no antitrust injury, no calculation of damages could be 
reliable, for any methodology that results in a positive estimate of 
nonexistent harm is per se unreasonable. Nevertheless, the Court was spared 
the burden of demonstrating the flaws in the methodology. But the Court was 
able to use antitrust injury as an effective filter only because non-predatory 
 
 
CIV. 6708 (CSH) 1994 WL 97201 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1994); Reebok Int’l Ltd., 120 F.T.C. 20 (1995) 
(Complaint, Decision and Order, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Starek); Keds Corp., F.T.C. 
File No. 9310067, 1993 WL 767043 (Aug. 31, 1993) (Consent Order and Complaint). 
 170. See Gross v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 242, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) 
(“Plaintiffs filed the instant action, relying extensively on the allegations used by the FTC in the 
Consent Order.”). See also New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 122 F.T.C. 137 (1996) (Complaint, 
Decision and Order, Concurring Statement of Commissioner Azcuenaga, Dissenting Statement of 
Commissioner Starek). 
 171. See supra notes 34–96 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra notes 124–68 and accompanying text. 
 173. ARCO v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990). 
 174. See id. at 335 n.5. 
 175. See id. at 346. 
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maximum vertical price fixing can be shown in theory never to inflict 
antitrust injury on competing dealers. An entire category of persons—the one 
to which the plaintiff belonged—could be excluded on antitrust injury 
grounds.176
By contrast, as we demonstrate in this Section, no class of plaintiffs 
alleging RPM can be disqualified on the ground that as a matter of theory 
RPM can never cause them antitrust injury. RPM can inflict antitrust injury 
on both of the relevant classes—consumers and dealers—in some 
circumstances and not in others, because RPM can have procompetitive as 
well as anticompetitive effects. Moreover, because RPM is illegal per se, 
courts do not typically require plaintiffs to allege that RPM was used for a 
particular economic purpose in their case. The implication is that, even 
though the claims of a class of actors could be dismissed on antitrust injury 
grounds when RPM is used for certain purposes, the court will not have the 
information necessary to make the determination. In RPM cases, therefore, 
where the practice has no anticompetitive consequences, the plaintiffs’ 
complaint will not be dismissed immediately for failure to allege antitrust 
injury, but the plaintiffs should ultimately lose for failure to prove damages 
adequately. Having rejected the plaintifffs’ damages calculation, the court 
might turn around and declare that the plaintiffs also failed to prove antitrust 
injury. But there would be little point to that. Thus in RPM cases, damage 
measurement obviates the need to address antitrust injury directly, but the 
principle of antitrust injury lurks in the background. Antitrust standing, as 
embodied in Illinois Brick, is a more promising screen, but as we show 
below, that doctrine applied to RPM cases is also problematic. 
Courts could usefully resuscitate antitrust injury as a litigation screen in 
RPM cases by requiring plaintiffs to identify in their complaints, and support 
with some evidence, the alleged function of RPM in their particular case. If a 
plaintiff could not plausibly assert that RPM was being used for an 
anticompetitive purpose, the court could dismiss the suit on antitrust injury 
grounds; a practice that is not anticompetitive causes no one antitrust injury. 
Even if antitrust injury were incorrectly defined to include loss unconnected 
to an inefficiency, the court might be able to determine whether the alleged 
use of RPM could have caused the plaintiff a cognizable injury. Such a 
requirement would also allow for a more sensible application of the antitrust 
standing doctrine. 
 176. Arguably consumers and the restricted dealers themselves should also be excluded for want 
of antitrust injury. See supra notes 36–60 and accompanying text. 
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To be sure, the requirement that plaintiffs allege a relevant theory of RPM 
would be in tension with the doctrine that RPM agreements are illegal per se, 
for some per se illegal RPM agreements would be held to inflict no antitrust 
injury; presumably, plaintiffs would eventually stop bringing actions based 
on economically unobjectionable uses of RPM. But the conflict would not be 
intolerable. The Court in ARCO rejected the contention that “any loss 
flowing from a per se violation of § 1 automatically satisfies the antitrust 
injury requirement.”177 And a tying arrangement is declared per se unlawful 
only after a substantial analysis of the context in which it is used.178 The per 
se rule is not as stark as its name implies, and courts could undo much of the 
economic mischief of the per se rule against RPM agreements without 
overruling it by foreclosing private suits based on RPM that is not 
anticompetitive. But this is only a proposal, and, to boot, one that lower 
courts would likely feel incompetent to adopt. Even if plaintiffs do not 
identify the relevant rationale for RPM, their obligation to prove damages 
will force courts implicitly to determine whether the rationale was 
anticompetitive. 
When a manufacturer supplies its product to retail distributors who resell 
to the ultimate consumer, its RPM plan may be attacked by consumers or 
distributors. For consumers, the prices they actually pay will almost certainly 
exceed the prices they would have paid (at least on average) absent the RPM 
program.179 After all, the point of any RPM plan is to keep the price higher 
than it would otherwise be. Consequently, a consumer may sue for damages 
alleging that he or she was overcharged pursuant to an agreement between 
the manufacturer and the retailer. In overcharge cases, the proper measure of 
damages is the difference between the actual price paid and the price that 
would have been paid “but for” the antitrust violation.180 To prove antitrust 
 177. ARCO, 495 U.S. at 335. 
 178. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–18 (1984). Product liability 
law offers an interesting parallel. Courts came to apply a negligence test to determine whether 
products contain design and warning defects. If a defect were found, however, courts nominally 
imposed strict liability—the courts “call[ed] a pig a mule.” See David G. Owen, Defectiveness 
Restated: Exploding the “Strict” Products Liability Myth, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 743, 749. 
 179. RPM will not always result in higher prices, however. For example, Perry and Besanko 
describe a situation in which the retail price with RPM may be lower than it would be without RPM. 
See Martin K. Perry & David Besanko, Resale Price Maintenance and Manufacturer Competition for 
Exclusive Dealerships, 39 J. INDUS. ECON. 517 (1991). See infra note 258–63 and accompanying text. 
In addition, actual prices may not be higher if dealers price below the suggested prices. 
 180. See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 487–88 (1968) 
(accepting trial court’s measure of damages in monopolization case as difference between the 
defendant’s actual rental prices and the price plaintiff would have paid to buy the machines); 
Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390, 396 (1906) (affirming an award 
of damages in a price fixing case based on “the difference between the price paid and the market or 
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injury and properly estimate damages, however, one must net out of the 
overcharge any benefits that the consumer received as a result of the RPM 
program.181 This, of course, requires knowing much more than simply 
whether an RPM plan existed. 
A distributor may sue under one of two circumstances, and in both, the 
measure of damages is net lost profits. First, if the distributor was terminated 
for failing to adhere to the manufacturer’s specified price (i.e., for being a 
discounter), the distributor may recover the profits that he or she would have 
earned but for the termination.182 Second, if the distributor acquiesced to the 
vertical price restraint, the distributor may recover the difference between the 
profits earned while charging the actual, fixed prices and the profits he or she 
would have earned by charging lower prices.183 In that case, profits lost 
 
 
fair price that the city would have had to pay under natural conditions had the combination been out of 
the way”); Burlington Indus. v. Milliken & Co., 690 F.2d 380, 385 (4th Cir. 1982) (recognizing that 
the “overcharge” from an illegal combination is “the difference between the prices actually paid and 
the prices that would have been paid absent the conspiracy”). 
 181. As a general proposition, any private antitrust plaintiff is entitled to damages based only on 
the net effect of the defendant’s unlawful conduct. See, e.g., Perma-Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts 
Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968) (“The possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a plaintiff’s 
point of view can of course be taken into consideration in computing damages . . . .”); Los Angeles 
Mem’l Coliseum Comm’n v. NFL, 791 F.2d 1356, 1366–67 (9th Cir. 1986) (“[G]eneral principles of 
damages . . . limit a plaintiff’s recovery under the antitrust laws to compensation for the ‘net’ injury 
incurred as a result of the defendant’s antitrust violation . . . . [I]n order to put a plaintiff in the position 
it would have been, absent the defendant’s antitrust violation, the plaintiff’s gross recovery for the 
antitrust violation must be reduced by any benefits that plaintiff would not have received had there 
been no anticompetitive conduct by the defendant”); Burlington Indus., 690 F.2d at 390–91 (reducing 
overcharge damages in conspiracy case by amount of “support services” provided by defendant). See 
also Blair & Page, supra note 93, at 429 (“The principle of individual net harm guides the definition of 
the plaintiff’s actual and but-for conditions.”); Phillip Areeda, Antitrust Violations Without Damage 
Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1136 (1976) (arguing for offset of “injuries which plaintiffs may 
have suffered at the hands of defendants with benefits which they may have derived from the very 
activities they attack”). This general proposition applies fully to RPM cases. 
 182. See, e.g., Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416, 429 n.15 (5th Cir. 1985) (recognizing 
lost profits as an appropriate measure of damages for dealer terminated as part of RPM agreement 
between manufacturer and other dealers); Spray-Rite Serv. Corp. v. Monsanto Co., 684 F.2d 1226, 
1240–44 (7th Cir. 1982) (affirming judgment based on lost profits where dealer was terminated 
pursuant to RPM agreement between manufacturer and other dealers), aff’d, 465 U.S. 752 (1984); 
Greene v. Gen. Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635, 660–66 (5th Cir. 1975) (permitting recovery based on lost 
profits where distributor was terminated for failure to adhere to resale prices fixed by defendant). 
 183. A dealer that merely acquiesces in a vertical price restraint, thereby participating in an 
unlawful agreement, is not because of that participation precluded from suing the manufacturer. Such a 
dealer does not “aggressively support and further the monopolistic scheme as a necessary part and 
parcel of it.” Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 140 (1968). Only a 
“plaintiff’s ‘complete, voluntary, and substantially equal participation’ in an illegal practice under the 
antitrust laws precludes recovery for that violation.” Sullivan v. NFL, 34 F.3d 1091, 1107 (1st Cir. 
1994) (citation omitted). See also Greene 517 F.2d at 645–47 (5th Cir. 1975) (rejecting in pari delicto 
defense where dealer acquiesced in vertical restraint); In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Export 
Antitrust Litig., 307 F. Supp. 2d 136, 141 (D. Me. 2004) (noting that dealers allegedly participating in 
an antitrust conspiracy with manufacturers could sue the manufacturers unless they “engaged in 
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because of an increase in the prices charged by the dealer consist of two 
components: the profits lost on sales made and the profits lost on sales 
forgone. Any calculation of lost profits, however, must take into account any 
benefits that the distributor earned as a result of the RPM program.184  
RPM is used to increase profits, of course, but profits can be increased in 
both procompetitive and anticompetitive ways. Law and economics scholars 
have offered various economic theories to explain the use of RPM.185 Some 
motivations for using RPM, such as facilitating horizontal collusion, are 
plainly anticompetitive. In these cases, prices are higher and output lower 
because of RPM. But RPM can also be used to increase profit by influencing 
demand. The result is often procompetitive—prices and output are higher—
though consumer welfare may be adversely affected.186  
Below, we explore the classic anticompetitive explanations for RPM: 
facilitating a manufacturer cartel or a dealer cartel. We also explore two 
classic procompetitive explanations: product-specific, or special, services and 
quality certification. We then examine more recent economic explanations 
for RPM. These models are used first to illustrate the difficulties encountered 
by consumers in proving antitrust injury and antitrust damages. We then 
address the challenges facing distributors claiming antitrust damages in RPM 
cases. 
A. Anticompetitive Motives for RPM and the Consumer Plaintiff 
The principal anticompetitive explanation of RPM is that it is used to 
enforce either a manufacturer cartel or a dealer cartel.187 The use of RPM as a 
facilitating device for horizontal collusion is plainly objectionable on 
economic grounds, because horizontal collusion causes a deadweight social-
 
 
complete, voluntary and substantially equal participation in the conspiracy”). The acquiescing dealer is 
entitled to recover as damages the profits lost because of the resale price restraint. See, e.g., Greene, 
517 F.2d at 660. 
 184. See Blair & Page, supra note 93, at 428–32. 
 185. The seminal paper is Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade? 3 J.L. 
& ECON. 86 (1960). For an interesting historical account of the economic learning prior to Telser’s 
analysis, see Breit, supra note 122. 
 186. Posner points out that RPM may be used by the manufacturer to promote brand loyalty 
among consumers and thereby obtain a competitive advantage over its rivals. Obviously, this strategy 
will have limited success if the manufacturer faces competition from differentiated products. See 
POSNER, supra note 3, at 174. 
 187. See Telser, supra note 185. Rey and Verge analyze the situation where manufacturers and 
retailers negotiate their own wholesale and retail prices in the context of interlocking relationships. See 
Patrick Rey & Thibaud Verge, Resale Price Maintenance and Horizontal Cartel (Mar. 11, 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://idei.fr/doc/by/rey/resalepricemaintenance.pdf). They find 
that RPM reduces both interbrand as well as intrabrand competition. In the limit, industry-wide 
monopoly pricing may result. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p657 Blair Herndon Lopatka book pages.doc 12/7/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
690 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:657 
 
 
 
 
 
 
welfare loss.188 If the per se rule against RPM can be justified on economic 
grounds,189 it would have to be because RPM is most often used to facilitate 
horizontal collusion.190
1. Manufacturer Cartel 
Suppose the manufacturers of a product form a cartel to restrict output 
and charge the monopoly price. In any cartel, each manufacturer has an 
incentive to cheat by slightly reducing its price and substantially increasing 
its output.191 RPM may be used to deter cheating where deviations from the 
agreed-upon resale price are easier to detect than deviations from the agreed-
upon wholesale price. A price reduction by the manufacturer will not directly 
increase its sales if the retail price does not drop; the primary beneficiary of 
the wholesale price decrease is the dealer, whose profit margin increases.192 
 188. Price fixing cartels are designed to raise price above the competitive level in an effort to earn 
profit. The effects are similar to those of monopoly: higher prices and reduced consumer (and total) 
welfare. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 30, at 132–51. See also HYLTON, supra note 6, at 
68 (“A cartel . . . seeks to increase profits by restricting price and output competition . . . .”). In United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927), the Court observed that “[t]he aim and 
result of every price-fixing agreement, if effective, is the elimination of one form of competition.” 
 189. Some commentators, of course, justify the per se rule against RPM agreements or similarly 
harsh treatment of them on grounds other than efficiency, such as the protection of dealer freedom. 
See, e.g., John J. Flynn, The “Is” and “Ought” of Vertical Restraints After Monsanto Co. v. Spray-
Rite Service Corp., 71 CORNELL L. REV. 1095, 1144 (1986) (arguing that a strong presumption of 
illegality in vertical price-fixing cases is justified because the conduct “impairs a central goal of 
antitrust policy—the independence of traders to set their own price and the concomitant public interest 
in receiving the benefit of one’s individual effort”). We disagree with that justification as well as the 
vision of antitrust objectives on which it is based. We note that this view is out of step with current 
orthodoxy and the justification of the per se rule provided by the Court itself in Business Electronics. 
See Bus. Elecs. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726–27 (1988). 
 190. In Dr. Miles, which established the per se illegality of RPM, the Court likened Dr. Miles’s 
vertical restraint to a horizontal cartel of its dealers. See supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
Hylton observes: 
[T]he law has been settled since Dr. Miles. Over the same period, the reasonableness justifications 
for resale price maintenance have filtered their way to the Court from various directions. . . . [T]he 
Court has essentially accepted all of the reasonableness justifications that might have been 
asserted by Dr. Miles. However, the rule of Dr. Miles remains the law. How long this rather 
strange state of affairs will continue is an open question.  
HYLTON, supra note 6, at 257. The Court has suggested that the continuing per se condemnation of 
RPM is based on the practice’s capacity to facilitate cartels among manufacturers or dealers, though 
the Court has not asserted that RPM is used to facilitate cartelization often enough to justify per se 
treatment. See supra notes 163–68 and accompanying text. The fact is that the per se rule lacks 
empirical support. 
 191. See BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 30, at 141–45. 
 192. RPM is unlikely to eliminate all cheating, however. Suppose manufacturer A could cheat on 
the cartel by offering a lower price on its brand of widgets to a dealer. Though the dealer cannot lower 
the price of Brand A to the consumer, the higher profit margin may lead the dealer to carry more of 
Brand A than other brands and/or to promote Brand A at the expense of other brands. Thus, while the 
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By reducing the gains from cheating, RPM diminishes the incentive to 
cheat.193
When a cartel raises price and reduces output, the overcharge paid by 
consumers who buy the product unquestionably constitutes antitrust injury; 
consumers who do not buy the product but would have bought it at the 
competitive price or who buy less of the product at the higher price also 
suffer antitrust injury, but their claims are insusceptible of proof and 
therefore generally incognizable. If RPM perfects a manufacturer cartel, 
therefore, consumers purchasing the product suffer antitrust injury, because 
they pay a higher price than they would have paid absent RPM, and the loss 
is connected to the inefficiency of the practice.  
Consumers appear to lack antitrust standing, however. Under Illinois 
Brick,194 a plaintiff must be a direct purchaser in order to recover for 
overcharges.195 In the case of a manufacturer cartel, the direct purchasers are 
the distributors while consumers are indirect purchasers. The anticompetitive 
conduct is the horizontal agreement among the manufacturers, and that 
generates the antitrust injury. Any overcharge absorbed by the consumer 
represents a “pass on” of part of the overcharge suffered by the distributor. 
Thus, the consumer’s injury is indirect. The vertical restraint has no 
independent competitive consequences beyond facilitating the 
manufacturers’ conspiracy. 
Consumers alleging RPM nevertheless typically manage to avoid the 
Illinois Brick bar under one of two theories.196 Some courts recognize a co-
 
 
dealer’s overall sales of widgets may not increase, the sales of Brand A widgets increase at the 
expense of other brands. Moreover, the manufacturer and/or the dealer can offer nonprice concessions 
while still complying with the resale price restrictions. As a result, to be highly effective, RPM would 
have to be accompanied by other vertical restrictions, such as exclusive dealing. See Telser, supra note 
185, at 97. This is a cumbersome way to enforce a cartel arrangement, however, which suggests 
infrequent use. 
 193. Jullien and Rey offer another theory of how RPM may facilitate a manufacturer cartel. They 
argue that RPM makes retail prices less responsive to random shocks to retail demand. By making 
retail prices more uniform, RPM makes it easier to detect cheating among the manufacturers and 
thereby enhances cartel stability. In this event, RPM decreases social welfare. See Bruno Jullien & 
Patrick Rey, Resale Price Maintenance and Collusion (May 9, 2000) (unpublished manuscript, 
available at http://idei.fr/doc/wp/2000/102_00.pdf).  
 194. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). For a recent analysis, see Roger D. Blair & 
Jeffrey L. Harrison, Reexamining the Role of Illinois Brick in Modern Antitrust Standing Analysis, 68 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1999). 
 195. Some states, however, permit indirect purchaser suits under their own laws. See generally 
Lopatka & Page, supra note 71; William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class 
Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 1 (1999); Ronald W. Davis, Indirect 
Purchaser Litigation: ARC America’s Chickens Come Home to Roost on the Illinois Brick Wall, 65 
ANTITRUST L.J. 375 (1997). 
 196. See generally 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 346h. 
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conspirator exception to Illinois Brick.197 When a dealer acquiesces—even 
upon threat of termination—in a manufacturer’s RPM plan, the antitrust law 
treats the arrangement as an agreement,198 and, according to these courts, 
Illinois Brick contains an exception for those who purchase from a co-
conspirator. Other courts hold that no co-conspirator exception is necessary 
because Illinois Brick simply does not apply; the plaintiff is a direct 
purchaser from a conspirator. As one court explained:  
The right to sue middlemen that joined the conspiracy is sometimes 
referred to as a co-conspirator ‘exception’ to Illinois Brick, but it 
would be better to recognize that Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick 
allocate to the first non-conspirator in the distribution chain the right 
to collect 100% of the damages.199
Yet the argument that, for one reason or the other, Illinois Brick does not 
bar a consumer action alleging RPM is based on a wooden reading of the 
case. A principal rationale of the indirect purchaser rule is that it prevents 
multiple liability. If RPM facilitates a manufacturer cartel, the consumers 
will seek to recover the overcharge passed on to them, but dealers will also 
have absorbed some of the overcharge. Even though dealers can be 
considered conspirators by acquiescing in an RPM arrangement imposed by 
manufacturers, their unwilling participation does not preclude them from 
suing the manufacturers.200 If consumers recover and dealers thereafter sue to 
recover overcharge damages, the dealers will be able to recover one hundred 
percent of the overcharge, for Hanover Shoe will prevent the manufacturers 
from asserting that the dealers passed on any of the overcharge. The 
manufacturers will be liable for as much as two hundred percent of the 
overcharge.  
In order to eliminate the potential for excessive liability, many courts 
require consumers asserting the co-conspirator exception to Illinois Brick in 
an RPM case to join the dealers as defendants.201 The dealers could cross-
 197. See, e.g., Arizona v. Shamrock Foods Co., 729 F.2d 1208, 1211–14 (9th Cir. 1984); Fontana 
Aviation, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 617 F.2d 478, 481 (7th Cir. 1980); Rozema v. Marshfield Clinic, 
977 F. Supp. 1362, 1375 (W.D. Wis. 1997). 
 198. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1968); United States v. Parke, Davis & 
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 45–47 (1960). 
 199. Paper Sys. Inc. v. Nippon Paper Indus. Co., 281 F.3d 629, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(Easterbrook, J.). 
 200. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968) (holding that the in 
pari delicto doctrine does not bar a participant in an antitrust violation from recovering against another 
participant so long as the plaintiff is not equally at fault). 
 201. See, e.g., Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171 n.4 (8th Cir. 1998); Link v. 
Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 931–33 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Midwest Milk Monop. 
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claim against the manufacturers, and the manufacturers would be subject to 
liability for no more than the full overcharge. The same logic would compel 
joinder of the dealers if the court took the position that Illinois Brick does not 
apply to the first purchaser from a vertical conspiracy. Though this 
procedural requirement eliminates the potential for duplicative recovery, it 
does so at the cost of litigation complexity, something that the Illinois Brick 
Court explicitly sought to avoid. The Court recognized that multiple liability 
could be avoided by joining all purchasers, direct and indirect, in a single 
action, but it adopted the indirect purchaser rule precisely to avoid the 
complexity of massive, multi-party litigation.202  
Thus, where manufacturers engage in horizontal price fixing unaided by 
RPM, consumers are barred by Illinois Brick from joining a suit by direct 
purchasers against manufacturers even though they pose no risk of 
duplicative recovery. Allowing consumers to recover by naming dealers as 
defendants simply because the manufacturers use RPM to perfect their cartel 
does an end-run around Illinois Brick. 
Some commentators argue, however, that dealers would not sue 
manufacturers for overcharges in an RPM case, but rather for lost profits, and 
that “lost profits damages for the intermediary and overcharge damages for 
the consumer are not in any way duplicative.”203 The apparent implication is 
that not only does Illinois Brick not bar recovery by consumers, but dealers 
need not be joined as defendants,204 because courts require the joinder of 
dealers only to avoid duplicative recovery. But if RPM facilitates 
manufacturer collusion, the dealers will be able to assert a claim for 
overcharges. And even though dealers almost always suffer lost profits when 
they are forced to pay an unlawful overcharge to their suppliers, they will 
prefer to assert a claim for overcharge damages. Under Hanover Shoe, they 
will be able to recover one hundred percent of the overcharge on sales made 
even though they passed on a portion of it, and that amount will almost 
always exceed the profits actually lost on sales made and sales not made 
because of unlawfully inflated costs. Their injury will not flow from the 
RPM agreement itself, but from the collusion enforced by the RPM program. 
 
 
Litig., 730 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litig., 600 F.2d 1148, 1160–63 
(5th Cir. 1979). 
 202. See Ill. Brick, 431 U.S. at 740, 731 n.11. 
 203. 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 346h. 
 204. Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Blair argue that “Illinois Brick does not limit suits by consumers 
against a manufacturer who illegally contracted with its dealers to set the latter’s resale price” because 
“[t]here is no problem of duplication or apportionment.” Id. ¶ 369. And they note that “courts 
generally hold that if a vertical conspiracy is alleged, the alleged conspirators must be named as 
parties” in order to avoid duplicative liability. Id. ¶ 370. They do not criticize the requirement, but their 
observation about the lack of a duplication problem implies that the requirement is misguided.  
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But that does not matter. By hypothesis, the only function of RPM in this 
case is to raise price and reduce output; the result is a single overcharge; and 
if the dealers recover one hundred percent of that overcharge in damages 
from the manufacturers for price fixing, and the consumers recover some 
amount of the overcharge from the manufacturers for the RPM agreements, 
the manufacturers will be liable for more than one hundred percent of the 
overcharge imposed.205
The implication of this analysis is that Illinois Brick should bar claims by 
consumers alleging RPM agreements between dealers and manufacturers 
where RPM is used to support horizontal collusion among manufacturers. 
But when plaintiffs are not forced to identify the purpose of the RPM 
agreement they allege, courts are hard-pressed to dismiss their claim on 
Illinois Brick grounds, because as we show below, Illinois Brick does not bar 
consumer claims where RPM accomplishes a purpose other than 
enforcement of a manufacturer cartel. Illinois Brick, then, is an imperfect 
litigation filter.  
Apart from the Illinois Brick hurdle, consumers face the formidable 
problem of estimating the overcharge due to the antitrust violation. 
Technically, the injury caused by RPM is measured by the difference 
between the actual price and the unperfected cartel price, not the competitive 
price. Of course, the cartel itself is illegal. Therefore the measure of damages 
from some antitrust violation is the difference between the actual price and 
the competitive price, and there is little reason to assign portions of the total 
overcharge to discrete, though connected, violations. If the plaintiffs cannot 
or do not prove the horizontal price-fixing agreement, however, they are not 
entitled to damages based on a competitive price.206
 205. Although a risk of duplicative recovery exists when RPM is used to facilitate a manufacturer 
cartel, it does not exist when RPM is used for other purposes, and this may be what Areeda, 
Hovenkamp, and Blair have in mind. Lost profits generally are measured by the difference between 
selling price and average variable cost. See infra note 285 and accompanying text. In the absence of an 
anticompetitive overcharge in the wholesale price, if the manufacturer merely increased the dealer’s 
resale price and the dealer’s variable costs were unaffected, the dealer’s profit margin on sales actually 
made would increase; the margin would remain the same if variable costs increased the same amount 
as the price increase. The dealer, therefore, would suffer no lost profits on sales made; he might in fact 
enjoy an increase in profits on sales made. But the higher resale price might result in lost volume, and 
the profit forgone on sales not made would represent lost profits. The profits lost on lost volume would 
have to be reduced by any profit gained on sales made at the higher price in order to calculate net lost 
profits. Crucially, so long as the only source of lost profits is sales not made, there is no potential of 
duplicative recovery, for the lost profits on sales not made by the dealer do not overlap with the 
overcharge paid by consumers for units actually purchased. Therefore, consumers would not need to 
join all dealers as defendants in order to avoid a risk of duplicative recovery. 
 206. This is an example of the need for disaggregating antitrust damages. See supra note 94. If a 
damage claim is based on the total overcharge and the plaintiffs fail to prove a horizontal conspiracy, 
the fact-finder will have no reliable basis on which to award damages for the resale price maintenance. 
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Proving the actual price paid is a fairly simple matter, but all relevant 
discounts, rebates, and any other price-reducing concessions (such as free 
credit) must be deducted. Estimating the “but for” price is more difficult as 
one would have to control for other factors at the manufacturing stage and at 
the distribution stage that contributed to the observed price increase.207
Inferring “but for” prices is difficult for another reason. Suppose the 
minimum resale price specified by the manufacturer is $50.00. If this is a 
binding constraint, the empirical evidence should show all distributors 
charging $50.00, for they would presumably charge less absent the RPM 
plan. But what if few $50.00 price tags are observed in the market? Often, 
many sellers charge actual prices above the specified price, a condition 
suggesting that RPM had no effect on those distributors’ pricing decisions.208 
It may be true, of course, that retailer A can charge, say, $60.00 knowing that 
retailer B cannot charge less than $50.00, but proving this in an adversarial 
setting and estimating the “but for” price would be extremely difficult. 
2. Dealer Cartel 
Suppose instead of a manufacturer cartel that the distributors conspire to 
raise prices above the competitive level. First, if this dealer cartel is for a 
single manufacturer’s brand, as is often assumed, then collectively the 
dealers must have sufficient market power to charge a supracompetitive 
price. That is, an RPM-induced increase in the price of, say, Levi’s jeans will 
not result in an increase in profit if a large proportion of Levi’s customers 
respond to the price increase by switching to Lee, Gap, or Wrangler jeans. 
Assuming that a dealer cartel could be profitable, it also would face the 
classic cheating problem. To address that problem, the dealers may solicit the 
manufacturer’s participation by demanding that it require dealers to charge a 
minimum resale price equal to that which maximizes the distributors’ joint 
profits.209  
 
 
See 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 391g. 
 207. For a discussion of proving antitrust damages and the need to control for factors other than 
the conspiracy, see 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶¶ 391a–391c. 
 208. Hylton also points out that an RPM plan that does not constrain a dealer has no effect. See 
HYLTON, supra note 6, at 253. 
 209. But there is a problem with this explanation: Why would the manufacturer agree to 
participate? A dealer cartel that increases the price and decreases the sales of the manufacturer’s 
product will increase the distributors’ profits while decreasing the manufacturer’s profit, whether the 
manufacturer faces some competition or is a pure monopolist. The manufacturer’s profit is maximized 
when its dealers charge competitive prices, and so the manufacturer would hardly want to help its 
dealers collude. See Howard P. Marvel, The Resale Price Maintenance Controversy: Beyond the 
Conventional Wisdom, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 59, 59 (1994) (concluding that the dealer collusion theory 
of RPM is “now clearly implausible.”). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p657 Blair Herndon Lopatka book pages.doc 12/7/2005  
 
 
 
 
 
696 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 83:657 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                        
In this case, the consumer unquestionably suffers antitrust injury and has 
antitrust standing to bring suit for overcharge damages; consumers pay an 
overcharge related to a real inefficiency caused by the practice, and they are 
direct purchasers from the horizontal conspirators.210 Once again, the 
presence of RPM—a vertical price restraint—does not have any independent 
competitive significance. All of the injury flows from the horizontal 
agreement among the distributors and, therefore, the consumer is the proper 
party to sue for damages. Indeed, the consumer will likely be the only private 
party that can recover.211 Of course, the consumer will face the usual 
problems of estimating damages.212
3. Empirical Evidence of Horizontal Collusion 
There is scant empirical evidence, however, that RPM is primarily, or 
even frequently, employed to facilitate collusive arrangements among 
manufacturers or dealers. For example, many of the cases involving vertical 
price restraints have been brought against manufacturers with relatively small 
market shares where there is no evidence of horizontal collusion.213 For 
instance, in In re Agricultural Chemicals Antitrust Litigation,214 Zeneca was 
accused of devising a rebate program that amounted to an illegal RPM plan. 
The plaintiffs did not allege horizontal collusion. Moreover, Zeneca had less 
than ten percent of the market, suggesting that it probably could not have 
charged noncompetitive prices.215 In another case, New Balance, whose 
resale pricing practices were challenged by the FTC and in a class action 
 
 
 In the event that the manufacturer is a monopolist, the result is a variant of the successive 
monopoly problem in which the sum of manufacturer and dealer profit is smaller than that obtained 
when monopoly power is exercised at only one stage. See, e.g., BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 30, at 
295–304; CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 398–401. Typically, successive monopolies lead to 
maximum resale price controls. Cf. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 
211 (1951) (discussing a situation in which affiliated distillers imposed maximum resale price 
restrictions on wholesalers exercising monopoly power). Maximum vertical resale price fixing, once 
illegal per se, is now accorded rule-of-reason treatment. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
For an analysis of Khan, see Blair & Lopatka, Death Becomes Her, supra note 50; Blair & Lopatka, 
Overruled, supra note 51. 
 210. See 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 346h.  
 211. The manufacturer is harmed by the collusion of its distributors, and its loss is antitrust injury. 
But suppliers to a cartel typically do not have standing to sue for damages. See 2 AREEDA, 
HOVENKAMP & BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 350c. 
 212. For an examination of these problems, see id. at 477–587; PROVING ANTITRUST DAMAGES, 
supra note 87, at 198–201; Blair & Page, supra note 93, at 423. 
 213. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 449; Howard P. Marvel & Stephen McCafferty, Resale 
Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 RAND J. ECON. 346, 347 n.4 (1984). 
 214. No. 94-40216-MMP, 1995 WL 787538 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 1995). 
 215. See id. at *5 n.7 (“Zeneca’s market share fluctuated between 8 and 9 percent during the years 
pertinent to this complaint.”). 
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lawsuit, was found to have a market share of only two percent.216 In an 
extensive empirical analysis of cases involving vertical price restraints, 
Pauline Ippolito found that only about ten percent of private enforcement 
cases and about thirteen percent of all cases (private and public) involved 
allegations of horizontal collusion.217  
In all, the empirical evidence does not support a presumption that RPM 
typically restricts competition and decreases output. The foundation for per 
se illegality, therefore, is missing.218
B. Procompetitive Motives for RPM and the Consumer Plaintiff 
Several efficiency rationales have been offered to explain RPM. 
Generally, these theories view RPM (and other vertical restraints) as a means 
of correcting some sort of externality problem. An externality can loosely be 
defined as a positive or negative effect of an action on individuals other than 
the actor that the actor does not take into account.219 A retailer makes 
decisions about price, quality, and service to maximize its own profit without 
regard to the manufacturer’s profit. But these same decisions do affect the 
manufacturer’s profit. A vertical externality occurs when the retailer fails to 
account for the extra profit that accrues to the manufacturer when the retailer 
provides demand-enhancing services.220 A horizontal externality occurs, for 
example, when one retailer can “free-ride” on the services provided by other 
retailers; in this case, the services provided by some dealers produce 
beneficial externalities for others.221 Both types of externalities result in the 
 216. See Gross v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 242, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In 
Gross, the district court found that the class lacked standing, and New Balance signed a consent order 
with the FTC. See New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 122 F.T.C. 137 (Complaint, Decision and Order, 
Concurring Statement of Commissioner Azcuenaga, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Starek). 
 217. Pauline M. Ippolito, Resale Price Maintenance: Empirical Evidence from Litigation, 34 J.L. 
& ECON. 263, 281 (1991). A sample of litigated cases may not be representative of all of the disputes 
involving RPM. But even if one assumes that Ippolito’s findings understate the true extent of collusive 
uses of RPM, it is clear that RPM is often used for noncollusive, and quite possibly procompetitive, 
purposes. 
 218. As the Court explained in BMI, the per se rule applies to those business practices in which 
“the practice facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition 
and decrease output.” Broad. Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1979).
 219. The air pollution that accompanies electric power generation is a classic example of a 
negative externality. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 40–42 
(3d ed. 2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (6th ed. 2003). 
 220. See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 177–78 (1989); Victor P. 
Goldberg, The Free Rider Problem, Imperfect Pricing, and the Economics of Retailing Services, 79 
NW. U. L. REV. 736, 737–44 (1984); G.F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, An Economic Theory of 
Vertical Restraints, 15 RAND J. ECON. 17, 32–33 (1984). 
 221. Telser applies this argument to the provision of product-specific services. See Telser, supra 
note 185. For a nice description of the free-rider problem, see Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, 
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provision of too little service. In the pursuit of increased profit, the 
manufacturer may employ RPM as a means of increasing demand, which 
will increase output. The result is that the manufacturer’s interest is aligned 
with consumer interest, and the vertical price restraint may enhance 
consumer welfare. When the RPM plan has procompetitive effects, therefore, 
a consumer’s ability to demonstrate net injury is at best problematic. We 
explore two classic efficiency explanations for RPM: (1) the provision of 
product-specific services; and (2) quality certification.  
1. Product-Specific Services 
Product-specific services include product-specific information from 
knowledgeable salespeople (often tailored to a consumer’s individual needs), 
product demonstrations, consumer trials (e.g., test drives of automobiles), 
and the like.222 If the services create value for the consumer, they will 
increase demand and thereby increase the sales of the product. Product-
specific services are often valuable for complex products purchased 
infrequently, because consumers typically desire information on product 
specifications, appropriate operation of the product, and the various 
applications of the product, and they will not be able to call on information 
gleaned from earlier purchases. For example, many high-technology goods, 
such as personal digital assistants (“PDAs”) and web cameras (“webcams”), 
require product-specific services for optimal sales and are not purchased 
often. Because retail dealers are the point of contact with consumers, they 
play a crucial role in communicating information and providing product 
demonstrations. 
The provision of these services is costly, however. If the consumer were 
able to obtain these services only on the condition that she buy the product, 
then the dealer would have an incentive to provide the desired product-
specific services up to the point where the additional value the consumer 
places on one more unit of service is equal to the incremental cost of the 
 
 
Can Post-Chicago Economics Survive Daubert? 34 AKRON L. REV. 795, 810 n.64 (2001): “The 
concept of ‘free riding’ involves the willingness of economic agents (such as retailers) to exploit 
investments of others for their own profit.” Marvel and McCafferty extend the analysis to “quality 
certification” services. See Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 213. Mathewson and Winter develop a 
model in which advertising spillovers result in horizontal externalities when retailers are spatially 
differentiated. See Mathewson & Winter, supra note 220. 
 222. See Telser, supra note 185. Bowman earlier set out the rudiments of the “special services” 
theory. See Ward S. Bowman, Jr., The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 825, 841–42 (1955) (“If the item sold is of such nature that a customer may get his 
service from a service dealer and a cut price from a non-service dealer, the manufacturer may suffer 
because of the elimination of service outlets.”). 
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service. But when a consumer can obtain these services from one dealer prior 
to the purchase and buy the product from a different dealer, the consumer 
and a discounting dealer can take a “free ride” on the efforts of full-service 
dealers. The selling dealer offers minimal or no services and is able to offer a 
lower price to the consumer. The full-service dealers will experience a 
decrease in the return on their investment in providing services and, as a 
result, will eventually provide fewer services. The end result is a sub-optimal 
amount of services to the detriment of the manufacturer and, possibly, to 
consumers.223 Though consumers pay lower prices, they also receive less, as 
they lose access to valued services.224 Moreover, the quantity sold decreases 
because some consumers who would have bought the product with the 
services provided by the full-service dealer will not buy the product absent 
these services.  
RPM is a mechanism by which manufacturers can induce the provision of 
optimal services. If all dealers must charge a minimum price—one that 
reflects the costs of providing the optimal amount of services—they will be 
forced to compete on nonprice terms.225 Of course, some dealers could still 
opt not to provide the desired services, but because they must charge the 
same price as the full service dealers, they will not be as attractive to 
consumers.226
 223. By “sub-optimal,” we mean relative to the level that would maximize the manufacturer’s 
profits. 
 224. Mathewson and Winter recognize the free ride that discounters take on high-price retailers 
that provide point-of-sale information. See G. F. Mathewson & R.A. Winter, The Incentives for Resale 
Price Maintenance Under Imperfect Information, 21 ECON. INQUIRY 337 (1983). They show that 
RPM improves welfare by eliminating free-riding and thereby enhances the flow of information. 
 225. Posner observes that the dealers will not enjoy excess profit. Whatever extra margin existed 
will be dissipated by nonprice competition. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 173. 
 226. RPM does not completely eliminate free riding since some dealers could offer “free” tie-ins 
(e.g., a free memory upgrade with each PDA), which effectively lowers the purchase price of the 
product and thereby allows the dealer to circumvent the vertical price restriction. Consequently, 
manufacturers also may monitor their dealers’ service provision and threaten termination if the service 
provision is found to be inadequate. But for termination to be costly to the dealer, the dealer must 
enjoy rents from selling the manufacturer’s product. In perfectly competitive retail markets, various 
forms of nonprice competition will drive the dealers’ economic profits to zero. Klein and Murphy 
develop a model in which RPM may allow dealers to earn a premium in markets characterized by 
imperfect competition: “[I]f we assume that sales cannot be increased by an arbitrarily large amount 
with an arbitrarily small decrease in the effective price to consumers, then dealers will not have the 
incentive to engage in a broad range of nonprice competition.” Benjamin Klein & Kevin M. Murphy, 
Vertical Restraints as Contract Enforcement Mechanisms, 31 J.L. & ECON. 265, 278 (1988). 
Termination, then, is costly to the dealers. Klein and Murphy’s analysis was criticized by Telser. See 
Lester G. Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade II? 33 J.L. & ECON. 409 (1990). Telser 
argues that RPM as a method of inducing pre-sale services is self-policing, in that, if the fixed resale 
price is observed, competition will force dealers to provide the services the manufacturer desires. But 
if RPM is used to promote efficiency in the ways suggested by other theories, it is not self-enforcing; 
the manufacturer would have to ensure that the desired services are being offered, and if monitoring is 
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Under this theory, the purpose of specifying a minimum resale price is 
promotional; it is designed to increase output. The manufacturer has 
determined that the product-specific services will increase the demand for its 
product more than the cost of providing those services. This is depicted in 
Figure 1, where D1 represents the demand for PDAs without product-specific 
services. The supply of PDAs is given by S1. Thus, the equilibrium price and 
output are P1 and Q1, respectively, when no services are provided by the 
dealers.  
Quantity
Price
S2
S1
D2
D1
P3
P2
P4
P1
Q1 Q2
Figure 1
 
Now suppose that the manufacturer wants its distributors to provide 
product-specific services that lead to a shift in the demand curve for its 
product. A PDA is worth more to consumers when thorough operating 
instructions and a demonstration of product features are provided than when 
they are not. Because the value of the PDA increases when these services are 
                                                                                                                         
 
necessary with RPM, RPM is unnecessary—it could be replaced by contractual specification and 
monitoring alone. 
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provided, the demand shifts from D1 to D2. But because the provision of 
product-specific services is not free, the supply curve shifts from S1 to S2 to 
reflect the increase in cost. The new equilibrium is P2 and Q2. The provision 
of product-specific services not only leads to an increase in price from P1 to 
P2, but to an increase in quantity from Q1 to Q2 because the vertical shift in 
demand exceeds the vertical shift in supply. This can be seen at Q1: the value 
of Q1 with the services increases from P1 to P3 whereas the cost of Q1 with 
the services increases by the smaller amount P1 to P4. 
Recall the purpose of RPM in this context: RPM is used to prevent free 
riding. When consumers can receive the benefits of the full-service 
distributors, but are lured to discounters by lower prices, the discounters are 
able to free ride on the efforts of the full-service distributors.227 As formerly 
full-service distributors begin to reduce their services, the demand curve will 
shift back toward D1. This reduction in demand will result in fewer sales and 
lower profits for the manufacturer. By imposing RPM, the manufacturer can 
blunt the consumer’s incentive to shop around for a lower price. There will 
be no reward for consuming product-specific services at one location while 
buying the product somewhere else. 
If RPM successfully prevents discounting, the prices paid by some 
consumers will be higher than they would have been if discounting had been 
permitted. But the consequences of discounting may be the elimination of 
product-specific services and a consequent reduction in the value of the 
product. Clearly, the marginal consumer228 at a quantity of Q1 is no worse off 
paying P2 and getting services along with the product than he or she would 
be paying P1 but not getting the service. In fact, the consumer who was just 
willing to pay P1 without receiving any services (i.e., the marginal consumer) 
is better off paying the higher price P2 and getting the services. This can be 
seen in Figure 1. The marginal consumer at a quantity of Q1 is just willing to 
pay P1 without receiving services. At Q1, the height of D2, which measures 
the willingness to pay when product-specific services are provided, exceeds 
the higher price of P2. Consequently, the consumer arguably has suffered no 
injury in fact. Any conception of antitrust injury assumes injury in fact, and 
so the consumer suffers no antitrust injury.229  
 227. Breit observes that one should identify the opportunistic consumers as the free riders; they 
get the product-specific services without paying for them by frequenting the discounters. See Breit, 
supra note 122, at 86. For our purposes, it makes no difference which group free-rides because the 
manufacturer imposes RPM in an effort to assure the provision of the services. 
 228. The “marginal consumer” is the person who is just willing to pay the market price. 
 229. In the case depicted in Figure 1, consumer surplus is higher with the services than without in 
spite of the price increase. This, of course, raises the question of why the practice is illegal, but that is 
a different problem. 
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Ordinarily, the overcharge measure of damages is understood as the 
difference between the actual price paid and the price that would have been 
paid but for the violation.230 In this case, however, it is not clear that there is 
an overcharge in the usual sense of the term. One possible measure of the 
“overcharge” would be the difference between the actual price paid and the 
price that a discounter would charge. If there are no discounters, it will be 
impossible to estimate the “but for” price because there will be no evidence. 
If there are discounters, the discounted prices will provide a benchmark of 
sorts. The consumer plaintiff still faces two problems. First, if there are 
discounted prices and the plaintiff did not frequent the discounter, the 
plaintiff would seem to have failed to mitigate her damages. Even if the 
discounted prices were only available for a short period, those prices 
arguably provide a “but for” price to compare to the actual price, but that 
raises a second, more important problem: The manufacturer should be 
entitled to an offset for the value of the product-specific services that RPM 
made possible. After all, the consumer did not get just the product; she got 
the product and the service. This offset, however, may well cause the net 
harm to evaporate. 
Due to the per se illegality of RPM, courts and juries may disregard the 
value-enhancing services provided, however, and award damages based on 
calculations that do not account for the value and costs of the services. 
Consequently, plaintiffs may be awarded damages for business practices that, 
in fact, caused no economic harm. For example, in the scenario described in 
Figure 1, a consumer might claim an overcharge equal to the difference 
between P1 and P2. The consumer, however, enjoyed product-specific 
services that were made possible by RPM, and the consumer is only entitled 
to recover an amount equal to the net harm suffered. This means that the 
value of the services must be deducted from the gross “overcharge” of P2 - P1 
in order to compute the net harm. Because the value of the services is P3 - P1, 
which exceeds P2 - P1, there is a net benefit rather than a net harm. This 
result follows from the fact that consumer surplus has actually increased as a 
result of the product-specific services.  
If all consumers value the product-specific services equally, the demand 
curve exhibits a parallel shift, as shown in Figure 1, and there is no harm to 
anyone. But all consumers may not value them equally. For example, a first-
time buyer of a PDA may want more help than a purchaser who is simply 
replacing an older model. In our economic model, this means that the shift in 
 230. In horizontal price fixing cases, this measure is sound. See, e.g., 2 AREEDA, HOVENKAMP & 
BLAIR, supra note 35, ¶ 394; Page, Antitrust Damages, supra note 39, at 472. 
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demand will not be parallel. In Figure 2, the provision of product-specific 
services leads to a counter-clockwise rotation of demand from D1 to D2. In 
this case, consumer surplus without the product-specific services is equal to 
area acP1 and with the product-specific services is equal to area abP2. In 
some cases (like the one depicted in Figure 2), consumer surplus will decline; 
in other cases, it will not.231 As a result, the appropriate antitrust policy is 
unclear.232
Quantity
Price
S2
S1
D2
D1
P2
P1
Q1 Q2
Figure 2
a b
c
 
 
 
 231. See William S. Comanor, Vertical Price-Fixing, Vertical Market Restrictions and the New 
Antitrust Policy, 98 HARV. L. REV. 983, 990–1000 (1985); F.M. Scherer, The Economics of Vertical 
Restraints, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 687, 692–700 (1983).  
 232. See Roger D. Blair & James M. Fesmire, The Resale Price Maintenance Policy Dilemma, 60 
S. ECON. J. 1043 (1994). See also POSNER, supra note 3, at 176 (arguing that this distinction can not 
be handled in a judicial setting and should be ignored); Comanor, supra note 3, at 1001–02 (arguing 
that vertical restraints applied to established products should be illegal per se or treated under a 
stringent rule of reason because they are likely to result in net consumer harm); Scherer, supra note 
231, at 707 (concluding tentatively that RPM “ought to be presumed legal only for relatively small 
upstream firms and in situations where its use is not ubiquitous”). 
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The possibility that RPM reduces both consumer surplus and total welfare 
implies that it might be condemned on economic grounds when it has these 
effects. And if RPM is inefficient, some parties must suffer antitrust injury. 
The marginal consumer has not suffered any injury in fact, as shown in 
Figure 2: The increase in the value to that consumer is the vertical distance 
between D1 and D2 at Q2 whereas the increase in price is only P2 - P1. Even at 
the original output of Q1, the shift in demand exceeds the increase in price. 
But infra-marginal consumers—those who derive a smaller increase in value 
from the services than the increase in price—have suffered a loss in 
consumer surplus that can be attributed directly to RPM. The measure of the 
loss is the increase in price minus the increase in value.  
Despite the fact that some consumers may have suffered antitrust injury, 
no consumer should be allowed to recover. First, when different consumers 
value services disparately, an RPM agreement that induces the provision of 
services may still increase efficiency. All that any individual consumer could 
possibly prove in litigation is that she did not value the additional services as 
much as the increase in price,233 but that showing would not prove that RPM 
reduced total welfare. No court would be able to distinguish between 
welfare-increasing and welfare-reducing RPM based on the injury to an 
individual consumer, and then allow recovery by the individual consumer 
where RPM reduced total welfare but deny recovery by the individual 
consumer for precisely the same kind of injury where RPM increased total 
welfare. Indeed, any seller configures his products in ways that are desirable 
to some consumers and undesirable to others; some consumers, for example, 
might like to buy an Infiniti with a digital clock but are not given that 
choice.234 A seller chooses a configuration that pleases the greatest number of 
consumers, recognizing that the administrative costs of creating multiple 
versions can be prohibitive. Efficiency requires that a seller be able to select a 
product configuration—or a level of service—with impunity.235
Second, the problem of proving that any given individual in fact valued 
the services less highly than the increase in price and the amount of any loss 
she suffered is intractable. Anyone could claim ex post that she placed very 
little—if any—value on the services, but determining the truth of the claim in 
 233. Even proving this much, of course, would be extremely difficult. Just what evidence could be 
offered beyond mere assertion is not obvious. 
 234. Infiniti automobiles long came equipped with analog clocks. When the manufacturer 
replaced them in new models with digital clocks, consumer opposition supposedly was so strong that 
the manufacturer returned to the analog style. 
 235. See generally Bowman, supra note 222, at 842–43 (noting that if some consumers prefer 
service and others no service, and if the manufacturer cannot segregate the markets, the manufacturer 
must choose between supporting the service dealers or the non-service dealers). 
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litigation would impose costs wildly disproportionate to the trivial stakes at 
issue. Moreover, calculating the amount of loss would be all but impossible. 
These problems of proof escalate for consumers seeking relief through a 
class action, for the class faces the additional and formidable obstacle of 
demonstrating common impact.236 This is especially significant given the 
prevalence of class actions in private enforcement efforts.237 Thus, even 
consumers who have experienced a loss should not be able to recover 
because they will be able to prove neither the existence nor the magnitude of 
their loss.  
2. Quality Certification 
The quality certification explanation for vertical price restraints arose in 
response to the observation that the “special services” theory fails to explain 
the use of RPM by manufacturers of products that do not appear to require 
product-specific services.238 For example, manufacturers of blue jeans,239 
china,240 boxed candy,241 and electric grills242 have imposed RPM on their 
dealers, yet consumers of these goods would not seem to require the 
knowledgeable salespeople, product demonstrations, or other product-
specific services that might be necessary for a PDA or a webcam. But the use 
of vertical price restraints for these goods also does not appear to be 
motivated by either manufacturer or dealer collusion. 
Quality certification, therefore, was offered as another explanation for 
RPM. Under this theory, the retailer is viewed not as the agent of the 
manufacturer but as the consumer’s agent. In this capacity, the retailer carries 
only those products that meet or exceed the minimum standard of quality that 
is consistent with the retailer’s reputation. For example, Neiman Marcus is 
widely recognized as a high-quality retailer—one renowned for carrying only 
 236. See, e.g., In re Agric. Chems. Antitrust Litig., No. 94-40216-MMP, 1995 WL 787538, at *4 
(N.D. Fla. Oct. 23, 1995) (refusing to certify a class of purchasers in action against manufacturer and 
distributors for inability to prove common impact). 
 237. See, e.g., Lopatka & Page, supra note 71, at 561 n.114 (collecting antitrust class action cases 
brought by direct and indirect purchasers). 
 238. This section relies on Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 213. 
 239. See Levi Strauss & Co., 92 F.T.C. 171 (1978) (Complaint, Decision and Order), modified, 
118 F.T.C. 1218 (1995). 
 240. See Lenox, Inc., 73 F.T.C. 578 (1968) (Complaint, Initial Decision by the Hearing Examiner, 
Commission Opinion and Order), modified, 77 F.T.C. 860 (1970), and set aside in part, 111 F.T.C. 
612 (1989). 
 241. See Russell Stover Candies, Inc., 100 F.T.C. 1 (1982) (Final Order), rev’d, Russell Stover 
Candies, Inc. v. FTC, 718 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1983). 
 242. The manufacturer of George Foreman grills was charged with exclusive dealing as well as 
RPM. See New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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high-quality products.243 If consumers observe that Neiman Marcus carries 
handbags by Kate Spade, shoes by Marc Jacobs, or scarves by Loro Piana, 
that certifies that the quality of those products is on a par with the Neiman 
Marcus reputation.244 Presumably, this quality certification involves some 
cost. The merchandise buyers at Neiman Marcus must continually evaluate 
new product offerings and must engage in ongoing monitoring of the quality 
of the products on which Neiman Marcus stakes its reputation. For many 
products, such as apparel, style as well as quality will be considered. Neiman 
Marcus may send its buyers to fashion shows to identify the latest styles and 
to evaluate the comfort, fit, and workmanship of different brands, whereas 
another retailer may make its purchasing decisions largely based on the cost 
of obtaining inventory.  
The free-rider problem arises if consumers look to Neiman Marcus for 
quality certification, but purchase from a lower-priced retailer that simply 
copies Neiman Marcus’s product offerings. The loss of sales to the copycat 
will erode the return to Neiman Marcus from engaging in quality 
certification. To preserve the quality-certification service provided by 
Nieman Marcus, the manufacturer may use RPM, guaranteeing Neiman 
Marcus a sufficient profit margin to cover its costs and denying the copycat 
the ability to profit from free-riding.245 In this case, the manufacturer “simply 
wishes to ensure that its product is distributed by retailers whose decision to 
carry that product provides consumers with valuable information about the 
product’s characteristics.”246 When RPM is used to protect the quality 
certification of a manufacturer’s product by a retailer, information costs 
incurred by consumers are reduced. Uncertainty regarding product quality is 
largely (if not entirely) removed. As a result, the demand for the 
manufacturer’s product expands.247 Consumers are willing to pay more for a 
 243. For an argument that prestige goods need to carry a high price and, therefore, should be 
exempt from the ban on RPM, see George R. Ackert, Note, An Argument for Exempting Prestige 
Goods from the Per Se Ban on Resale Price Maintenance, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1185 (1995). 
 244. This does not apply to luxury goods alone. Sears, for example, has a reputation for 
dependable quality. When Sears stocks a brand, it also certifies that the product is dependable. See, 
e.g., Where to Buy, CONSUMER REP., July 2002, at 11 (reporting the results of a survey of subscribers 
to Consumer Reports regarding their shopping experiences at “mass merchants” and concluding that 
Sears stood out for its high rankings on product quality). 
 245. Another way to do this is to offer Neiman Marcus a discount so it can recover its quality 
certification costs. This alternative would invite private suits under the Robinson-Patman Act, which 
prohibits price discrimination under certain conditions. 
 246. Marvel & McCafferty, supra note 213, at 349. 
 247. Marvel and McCafferty observe: “Raising [the resale price] . . . will raise demand by 
inducing higher quality retailers to enter the market with no consequent reduction in outlets.” Id. at 
353. Springer and Frech show that RPM can be used to eliminate a retailer’s incentive to substitute 
lower-cost, inferior goods for higher-cost, superior brands. See Roger F. Springer & H.E. Frech, III, 
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product with quality certification than without quality certification. In 
essence, the consumer is getting more than just the physical product when 
there is some assurance (if not a guarantee) of quality. For the private 
plaintiff, the difficulty of proving net harm and, therefore, injury in fact is the 
same as it was with the product-specific services situation examined 
above.248 Proving antitrust injury is problematic at best, and proving damages 
coherently is virtually impossible. 
C. Additional Motives for RPM and the Consumer Plaintiff 
Because many uses of RPM can be neither attributed to facilitating 
collusion nor explained by the special services or quality certification 
rationales, the academic analysis of RPM has continued beyond the models 
reviewed above. We examine some of the subsequent research on economic 
motivations for RPM. First, we examine the use of RPM in response to 
demand uncertainty. Next, we review models in which manufacturers must 
compete for distribution services.249 Finally, we consider an explanation of 
RPM based on price discrimination. 
1. Demand Uncertainty 
David Butz analyzes the effect of uncertain demand on a manufacturer’s 
ability to earn profit.250 To obtain a benchmark solution, he solves the profit-
maximization problem for a monopoly manufacturer that is vertically 
integrated and distributes its product through two company-owned outlets.251 
He then shows that the manufacturer can earn the same profit by selling to an 
 
 
Deterring Fraud: The Role of Resale Price Maintenance, 59 J. BUS. 433 (1986). In their model, 
quality is preserved and consumers are not misled. This, of course, is socially efficient as misinformed 
consumers do not make optimal decisions. In this case, RPM leads to higher demand than would 
otherwise be the case. 
 248. See supra notes 222–38 and accompanying text. 
 249. There are other relatively recent economic explanations as well. For example, Yongmin Chen 
examines RPM as a response to oligopoly price discrimination in the retail market that “makes it 
impossible for the manufacturer to set a wholesale price that would induce the retail prices (or retail 
margins) that maximize the joint profits of the manufacturer and retailers.” Yongmin Chen, Oligopoly 
Price Discrimination and Resale Price Maintenance, 30 RAND J. ECON. 441, 442 (1999). 
 250. David A. Butz, Vertical Price Controls with Uncertain Demand, 40 J.L. & ECON. 433 
(1997). For an earlier effort, see Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76 AM. 
ECON. REV. 921 (1986). For other analyses of RPM and uncertain demand, see Raymond Deneckere, 
Howard P. Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as 
Destructive Competition, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 619 (1997) [hereinafter Deneckere et al., Destructive 
Competition]; Raymond Deneckere, Howard P. Marvel & James Peck, Demand Uncertainty, 
Inventories, and Resale Price Maintenance, 111 Q. J. ECON. 885 (1996). 
 251. See Butz, supra note 250, at 436–38. 
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independent, two-outlet chain.252 The manufacturer’s profit may be 
threatened, however, if the two distribution outlets are independent of the 
manufacturer, are separately-owned, and face uncertainty in the demand for 
the product.253 The two independent distributors commit to quantities before 
the resolution of the demand uncertainty. When demand is low, the 
distributors will sell off their inventory at market-clearing prices that are 
below the joint profit-maximizing price, thus reducing their expected returns. 
In turn, this reduces the amount that they will pay the manufacturer for the 
product, which reduces the manufacturer’s profit. By setting a minimum 
resale price at the appropriate level, the manufacturer prevents intrabrand 
competition and thereby raises the expected returns at the distribution stage. 
This raises the price that the distributors are willing to pay for the product 
and, correspondingly, the profits of the manufacturer. In this case, RPM is 
used in lieu of vertical integration.254  
When RPM is used to increase manufacturer profits in the presence of 
demand uncertainty, consumers face considerable problems in proving injury 
in fact and damages. Consumers can, of course, identify the prices that they 
actually paid for the good in question, but proving the prices “but for” the 
RPM contract is problematic. When demand is low, the “but for” price will 
be lower than the price specified by the manufacturer. But when demand is 
high, the “but for” price is higher than the price specified by the 
manufacturer; the price specified by the manufacturer is not binding, and 
distributors charge the same price that they would charge in the absence of an 
RPM plan. RPM, therefore, imposes costs on consumers only when demand 
is low. In related research, Raymond Deneckere, Howard P. Marvel, and 
James Peck demonstrate that when demand is high, the price obtained under 
the manufacturer’s RPM plan may, in fact, be lower than that obtained in the 
absence of RPM.255 In this case, determining damages becomes even more 
complicated because the damages suffered by plaintiffs during periods of low 
demand must be offset by the benefits that they received during periods of 
 252. See id. at 438–42. 
 253. By assumption, the distributors do not collude—tacitly or otherwise. 
 254. Butz, supra note 250, at 446. Using RPM to induce profit-maximizing behavior is not 
seamless, however. When demand is low, the distributors will have unsold inventory at the specified 
price. Thus, the manufacturer will welcome the assistance of the distributors in monitoring prices to be 
sure that there are no discounted sales. 
 255. This result occurs when there is not a large disparity between the high- and low-demand 
states. When the two states are sufficiently close, distributors have an incentive to accumulate a 
smaller amount of inventory since price is driven to zero in the low-demand state. RPM prevents the 
price from falling to zero, and distributors compete by expanding their inventories; therefore, 
distributors’ inventories rise, which results in a lower price in the high-demand state. See Deneckere et 
al., Destructive Competition, supra note 250, at 625. 
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high demand. Additionally, these authors show that it is possible for RPM to 
result in a net improvement in consumer welfare.256 Even if consumers could 
establish an injury in fact based on purchases made during periods of low 
demand, demonstrate a net loss, and quantify the damages, the use of RPM to 
address demand uncertainty produces no antitrust injury. Ex ante, RPM is 
used to increase efficiency by allocating risk, and at most an inefficiency can 
be detected only in an ex post sense. The proper perspective in assessing the 
effects of a practice is ex ante.257
2. Competition for Exclusive Distributorships 
Martin Perry and David Besanko consider two competing manufacturers 
that rely upon exclusive distributors and, therefore, must compete indirectly 
for customers by competing for retail distributors.258 The products are not 
perfect substitutes and, therefore, each manufacturer has some market power 
that will allow it to earn positive economic profit. This profit can be captured 
through a franchise fee, a wholesale price that is greater than marginal cost, 
or some combination of the two. Perry and Besanko examine the impact of 
RPM on equilibrium outcomes under different combinations of franchise 
fees and wholesale prices.259 In one variant of their model, Perry and 
Besanko assume that the wholesale price is equal to marginal cost and that 
each manufacturer earns its profit solely through a franchise fee.260 When 
RPM is used in this case to prevent intrabrand competition among a 
manufacturer’s exclusive dealers, the equilibrium retail price is higher than it 
would be in the absence of RPM.261  
When the manufacturers can both set wholesale prices above marginal 
cost and charge franchise fees, Perry and Besanko reach an interesting result. 
If RPM is not permitted, the manufacturer will earn its profit by charging a 
franchise fee in combination with a wholesale price above marginal cost.262 
The retail price to consumers will be the monopolistically competitive 
markup over the wholesale price. If RPM is permitted and the manufacturers 
 256. See id. 
 257. In these models, distributors earn only competitive (expected) returns no matter what they do 
because the manufacturer fully appropriates any supra-competitive profits. As a result, disgruntled, 
acquiescing dealers and terminated dealers have no damages. For a general discussion of the 
challenges that distributors face in proving damages, see infra notes 283–300 and accompanying text. 
 258. See Perry & Besanko, supra note 179, at 520. 
 259. Perry and Besanko evaluate the impact of both maximum and minimum resale prices. See id. 
at 527–30, 533–35. Because our focus is on minimum resale prices, we include only those cases here.  
 260. See id. at 530. 
 261. See id. at 534. 
 262. See id. at 539. 
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choose to earn their profit solely through a franchise fee (and, therefore, 
charge a wholesale price equal to marginal cost), the use of RPM decreases 
the retail price. This seemingly counterintuitive outcome results because the 
manufacturers obtain part of their profit by setting the wholesale price above 
marginal cost in the non-RPM equilibrium, and the retail price is a markup 
over the wholesale price. In the RPM equilibrium, manufacturers obtain their 
profit solely through a franchise fee, setting the wholesale price equal to 
marginal cost. As a result, the retail price is lower than in the non-RPM 
equilibrium even though the manufacturer imposes a minimum resale price 
to preserve retailer profits.263 In this case, consumers sustain no antitrust 
injury and have no cognizable claim for damages. The central point to be 
learned from the Perry and Besanko analysis is that the effect of an RPM 
program is a priori ambiguous; whether RPM enhances or diminishes 
consumer welfare depends on the specific circumstances.264  
3. RPM and Slotting Allowances 
Manufacturers may compete for customers by competing for the shelf 
space of retail distributors. One way of competing for shelf space is to offer 
slotting allowances to the retail distributors, i.e., initial, lump-sum fees that 
are paid to retailers for shelf space.265 The manufacturer charges wholesale 
prices that are above marginal cost, but the slotting fees offset the markup to 
some extent. An alternative to slotting allowances is RPM.266 Both of these 
business strategies are used to enhance the profits of the retailers, who have 
scarce shelf space, by reducing intrabrand price competition.267 In this 
 263. Thus, the legal prohibition of RPM in some circumstances will lead to higher prices for 
consumers, surely a perverse result of antitrust enforcement.  
 264. This point has been demonstrated in other contexts as well. Chen, in another seemingly 
counterintuitive result, finds that consumer welfare can be higher under an RPM program in retail 
markets characterized by oligopoly price discrimination even when total output is reduced when it 
“raises output to those consumers with higher expected valuations while it reduces output to those 
consumers with lower expected valuations.” Chen, supra note 249, at 451. Chen notes that the “effect 
of RPM on welfare turns out to be ambiguous in general,” id. at 451, and he concludes that “[a] careful 
examination of the economic factors is often needed to determine the effects of RPM in a particular 
situation.” Id. at 454–55. 
 265. Slotting fees appear to be most commonly found in retail groceries. See Greg Shaffer, 
Slotting Allowances and Resale Price Maintenance: A Comparison of Facilitating Practices, 22 
RAND J. ECON. 120, 120–21 (1991). 
 266. Shaffer has analyzed the use of RPM by manufacturers as an alternative to slotting 
allowances in a perfectly competitive industry. See id. 
 267. When retailers agree to an RPM plan, they commit directly to charging a higher price. 
Because manufacturers require nonnegative profits, slotting allowances are accompanied by a 
wholesale price that exceeds marginal cost. Therefore, when retailers accept slotting allowance 
contracts, they implicitly commit to higher retail prices. Id. at 121, 130–31. 
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context, RPM—as well as slotting allowances—may be anticompetitive.268 
Prices to consumers are higher than they would be if neither RPM nor 
slotting fees were permitted.269 As a result, consumers may have a valid 
claim for damages. Any injury in fact suffered by consumers would be an 
antitrust injury, and because the plan is designed to benefit retailers, 
consumers are not barred from recovery by Illinois Brick. Nevertheless, 
consumers face significant challenges. First, consumers must identify this 
motivation for using RPM. Second, consumers must prove that they would 
have been better off without RPM, taking into account that slotting 
allowances, which are not prohibited, might have been used instead. If RPM 
relative to lawful alternatives did not make consumers worse off, they did not 
suffer injury in fact. Finally, consumers would have to estimate the prices 
that would have prevailed but for the RPM agreement, again taking into 
account the possibility of slotting allowances.270
4. RPM and Price Discrimination 
If a manufacturer with some monopoly power sells a product without 
restriction to a competitive level of dealers at a monopoly wholesale price, 
and the dealers resell to consumers, the manufacturer earns a measure of 
monopoly profits, dealers earn no economic profit, consumers receive a 
measure of surplus, and society suffers a deadweight loss. Consumer surplus 
arises because different consumers place different values on any product, and 
infra-marginal consumers value the product more highly than the monopoly 
price. If the manufacturer could charge each consumer a different price set at 
the value placed on the product by that consumer, as long as the price is no 
lower than marginal cost, the manufacturer could turn all of the consumer 
surplus and all of the deadweight loss generated at the monopoly price into 
monopoly profits.271 Such a practice would constitute a type of price 
discrimination—charging different consumers different unit prices for a 
product where the costs incurred by the seller in supplying the consumers do 
 268. In this case, the higher price paid by consumers is not offset by value-enhancing services. 
 269. See Shaffer, supra note 265, at 130–35. Shaffer shows that public policy should prefer RPM 
to slotting allowances. A per se rule against RPM makes no sense in the absence of a prohibition of 
slotting allowances. 
 270. If the non-RPM equilibrium includes slotting allowances, the “but for” price may be higher 
than the actual price paid with RPM. In that event, there would be no injury in fact and therefore no 
antitrust injury. 
 271. Technically, monopoly power exists when the firm faces a downward-sloping demand curve. 
That is the condition necessary to earn monopoly profits and to price-discriminate. The monopoly 
power need not rise to the level that is normally required to raise antitrust concern.  
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not change.272 For price discrimination to succeed, not only must the 
manufacturer ascertain the value placed on the product by different 
consumers and prevent arbitrage among consumers,273 it must, of course, 
actually charge different prices. When the manufacturer sells to dealers, who 
themselves are free to sell to any consumer, the manufacturer has no 
mechanism to induce consumers to pay the full amount they are willing to 
pay. No dealer can engage in price discrimination because, in a competitive 
dealer market, no dealer has monopoly power. 
One way for a monopolist manufacturer to practice price discrimination is 
to divide the consumer market into categories based on the value placed on 
the product, confine dealers to particular categories, and set different 
wholesale prices for each category.274 The result is imperfect price 
discrimination.275 But another way is to set individual resale prices to charge 
particular consumers or consumer classes. Any dealer can sell to any 
consumer, but the manufacturer sets different wholesale prices for resales to 
different consumers, and the dealer agrees to charge the consumer a resale 
price set by the manufacturer specifically for that consumer. The 
manufacturer could not merely set disparate wholesale prices, because 
without imposing some form of customer restriction on dealers, the 
manufacturer could not easily determine whether wholesale purchases at low 
prices were being diverted to high-value consumers.276 Critically, price 
discrimination cannot explain an instance of RPM unless the manufacturer 
sets nonuniform resale prices. 
 272. See generally CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 8, at 274. 
 273. See generally id. at 277. If arbitrage is possible, consumers who are charged a low price 
could buy more than they want and resell the excess to consumers facing a high price from the 
manufacturer; these high-value consumers will prefer the lower price offered by other consumers, and 
the manufacturer will lose sales. 
 274. For example, in United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), the manufacturer 
attempted to divide the consumers of incandescent lamps into two markets and charge industrial users 
a lower price than domestic users. See Bowman, supra note 222, at 839–40. The success of the plan 
required that industrial users be prevented from reselling to domestic users, and industrial users were 
contractually bound not to resell. See General Electric, 272 U.S. at 482–84. But success also required 
that dealers be prevented from diverting low-cost lamps destined for industrial users to domestic users. 
See Bowman, supra note 222, at 840.  
 275. This kind of price discrimination is sometimes called third-degree price discrimination. See 
A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920). The economic welfare effects of this kind of price 
discrimination are ambiguous. See generally Benjamin Klein & John Shephard Wiley Jr., Competitive 
Price Discrimination as an Antitrust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 
ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 612 (2003). 
 276. Bowman points out that RPM likely could not have been an effective method of price 
discrimination in General Electric because dealers were not prevented from diverting lamps intended 
for low-value, industrial users to high-value, domestic users. See Bowman, supra note 222, at 840. 
Where diversion can be prevented, however, price discrimination is possible.  
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If RPM is used to price-discriminate, the welfare implications are 
ambiguous. Perfect price discrimination eliminates the allocative inefficiency 
caused by single-price monopoly pricing. In this respect, it is more efficient 
than a single-price monopoly and just as efficient as perfect competition.277 
But imperfect price discrimination need not have these effects, and price 
discrimination of either kind can reduce productive efficiency as the seller 
uses resources to operate the price-discrimination system.278 Perhaps because 
the effects of price discrimination in individual instances are uncertain, 
antitrust law contains no general prohibition of price discrimination.279 
Rather, price discrimination is outlawed in certain settings, such as in the sale 
of commodities where the requirements of the Robinson-Patman Act are 
met,280 and certain practices, such as tying, which may be used to price 
discriminate are condemned even when used for that purpose.281
The possibility of RPM being used to price-discriminate poses difficult 
issues of antitrust injury and damage calculation. Assuming the monopoly 
power possessed by the seller is lawful, a consumer who pays more for a 
product than she would have paid had a single monopoly price been set is 
injured. But if price discrimination is perfect, RPM causes no total welfare 
loss; indeed, it increases total welfare relative to the single-price monopoly 
outcome.282 If antitrust injury is defined as a loss that is connected to the 
inefficiency of a practice, the consumer’s loss is not antitrust injury. The 
consumer suffers an antitrust injury only if the purpose of the antitrust law is 
defined more narrowly as the promotion of consumer welfare, rather than 
social welfare. If as a result of price discrimination a consumer buys the 
product at a price below the single monopoly price and above the 
competitive price—a consumer represented in the deadweight-loss triangle 
 277. There are, however, distributive effects. With perfect price discrimination, the monopolist 
extracts all of the potential consumer surplus; with competition or a single-price monopoly, he does 
not. 
 278. See POSNER, supra note 3, at 83. 
 279. See, e.g., USM Corp. v. SPS Techs., Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[N]o general 
principle of antitrust law forbids charging different prices to different customers, what is often but 
loosely called ‘price discrimination.’”). Thus, if a method of price discrimination is otherwise lawful, a 
manufacturer may engage in price discrimination and enlist the aid of distributors, even if the 
distributors act collectively. See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 
784–85 (7th Cir. 1999). 
 280. See 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (2000). 
 281. Tying is nominally treated as per se illegal. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 
466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984). It is now well understood that tying can be used to price discriminate. See, e.g., 
BORK, supra note 8, at 376–78; POSNER, supra note 3, at 199–200. The Court has never suggested that 
tying avoids condemnation if it is used as a method of price discrimination. 
 282. Perfect price discrimination is sometimes called first-degree price discrimination. See PIGOU, 
supra note 275. 
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produced by single-price monopoly pricing—the consumer suffers no injury 
in fact from RPM. The consumer gains as a result of RPM. Overcharge 
damages must be limited to transactions that occur at a price above the single 
monopoly price, not the competitive price. And estimating the single 
monopoly price may be more difficult than estimating a competitive price, 
which is the typical “but for” condition. Indeed, if the defendant could have 
resorted to a lawful, alternative form of price discrimination, though one less 
perfect than RPM, even the single monopoly price would overstate damages. 
D. Distributor Claims in RPM Cases 
Whether a dealer subject to, or presented with, an RPM plan may 
maintain an action depends initially on the rationale for RPM in his particular 
case. Just as antitrust process would benefit if consumers were forced to 
assert an economic rationale for RPM in any complaint alleging the practice, 
so too would the process benefit if dealers were required to do so. In any 
event, the plaintiff may sometimes offer an explanation, and sometimes 
certain explanations can be excluded as an implication of the plaintiff’s 
allegations. A court might or might not be able to dismiss the action for 
failure to satisfy the prerequisites of private recovery based on the viable 
theories of RPM disclosed by the complaint. Moreover, discovery may lead 
to uncontroverted facts that are consistent or inconsistent with various 
theories of RPM, and summary judgment may be appropriate at that time. 
Dealers that seek damages for RPM agreements will generally fall into 
one of two categories: dealers that are terminated for failure to comply with 
the minimum price set by the manufacturer, or dealers who claim to have 
been injured by unwillingly charging the minimum price. Of course, a dealer 
who does not adhere to the minimum price set by the manufacturer and is not 
terminated suffers no injury in fact from an RPM agreement between the 
manufacturer and other dealers, which is the only RPM agreement that might 
be established.283 We examine in this Section the potential claims of 
terminated dealers and dealers adhering to minimum resale prices in the 
context of the major economic rationales for RPM set out above. 
 283. See Lake Hill Motors, Inc. v. Jim Bennett Yacht Sales, Inc., 246 F.3d 752, 756–57 (5th Cir. 
2001). Though a dealer might be able to assert an agreement between himself and the manufacturer as 
of the date he unwillingly complies with a minimum resale price demand, see Albrecht v. Herald Co., 
390 U.S. 145 (1968), if he does not comply then he does not enter into an agreement with his supplier. 
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1. Anticompetitive Rationales 
The cartel explanations have straightforward implications for dealer 
plaintiffs. If RPM is used as a method of facilitating a manufacturer cartel, a 
dealer that acquiesced in the specified price would by assumption have paid 
an overcharge on the units purchased. The difference between the actual 
price and the noncollusive price multiplied by the number of units the dealer 
purchased would constitute injury in fact and antitrust injury, and the dealer, 
as a direct purchaser, would have antitrust standing. The calculation of the 
but-for, noncollusive price might be difficult, but no more so than in any 
other cartel case. In this situation, the overcharge injury is not caused by the 
RPM agreement, but rather by the collusion the RPM agreement facilitates. 
The dealer might claim that he is entitled to lost profits because of the 
inflated resale price.284 The proper measure of lost profits involves estimating 
the contribution margin on the lost business.285 But allowing the dealer to 
recover both lost profits and overcharge damages would result in greater 
liability than would be imposed if the cartel had charged the same supra-
competitive price without the aid of an RPM agreement. In the latter case, 
only full overcharge damages are allowed, even though they do not account 
for the deadweight loss caused by cartel pricing. The RPM agreement has no 
independent significance, and it cannot be the basis of the dealer’s claim.  
A dealer that is terminated for refusal to adhere to a minimum resale price 
where RPM is used to enforce a manufacturer cartel is in a different position. 
The defendants’ conduct unquestionably reduces welfare, but the dealer does 
not suffer antitrust injury in the standard way. The dealer, by assumption, 
suffers no overcharge injury. Further, because other dealers presumably 
 284. “Lost profits” when used as a measure of damages in an antitrust case is an accounting 
concept. The claim that a dealer loses profits when his costs are anticompetitively increased implies 
that he earns profits when costs are determined competitively. Yet in competitive markets, firms earn 
no economic profits. Therefore, if wholesale prices are competitive, competitive dealers earn no 
economic profits; if wholesale prices are supra-competitive, competitive dealers earn no economic 
profits. Collusion among manufacturers in setting wholesale prices causes no loss of economic profits. 
The economically shaky justification for the award of lost profits in antitrust cases has led some 
scholars to argue that lost profits should not be used as a general measure of antitrust damages. See, 
e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 64, at 462–63; William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust 
Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 417–18 (1985). But see Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
The Lost Profits Measure of Damages in Price Enhancement Cases, 64 MINN. L. REV. 751, 753 
(1980) (arguing that “lost profits rather than gross overcharge or pass-on adjusted overcharge is the 
most appropriate measure of damages in price enhancement cases”). 
 285. The contribution margin is the difference between the lost revenue and the costs that were 
avoided by not making the lost sales. These avoided costs include the cost of goods sold and the direct 
selling costs, but do not include overhead costs. They can be thought of as average variable costs. 
Hence, the contribution margin typically exceeds—sometimes substantially—the average profit 
margin because the latter does include overhead costs. 
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acquiesce in the RPM plan, the refusal of the terminated dealer to participate 
causes no loss in consumer welfare. If the dealer is allowed to recover lost 
profits while dealers adhering to the RPM agreements recover overcharge 
damages, the manufacturer faces a risk of excessive liability. If the 
manufacturer had not imposed RPM and had charged a noncollusive 
wholesale price, the dealer would have earned accounting profits on a certain 
volume of sales. But some of those sales were in fact made by dealers 
acquiescing in the RPM agreements, who can recover as overcharge damages 
the monopoly profits earned from the collusion. Awarding lost profit 
damages to the terminated dealer on the entire volume of sales he would have 
made absent RPM at the noncollusive price would to some extent duplicate 
the potential recovery of acquiescing dealers suing as direct purchasers. 
There is no way in litigation to allow the dealer to recover only the profits 
that would have been made on the sale of additional units if the cartel had not 
restricted output. The dealer stands in much the same position as any 
individual who did not purchase a product but claims she would have had the 
price been lower. Those claims are routinely rejected. The one kind of 
antitrust injury the terminated dealer may suffer is a loss in value of any 
assets tailored specifically to the market from which he is excluded.286
If dealers are using RPM to facilitate their own cartel, they would have no 
cause of action. A dealer first would have to establish injury in fact. A dealer 
terminated by the manufacturer for cheating on the dealer cartel would lose 
the profits of cheating; a dealer adhering to the RPM agreement might lose 
profits if enough of his customers shift to other products he does not sell. 
Neither loss represents antitrust injury. It is one thing to refuse to enforce 
cartel agreements287 and quite another to award damages to a defecting 
cartelist. In any event, the dealers in these cases would be barred from suing 
other members of the cartel by the doctrine of equal responsibility.288
2. Procompetitive Rationales 
The efficiency-enhancing explanations of RPM have less obvious 
implications for suits by dealers. In all of these explanations, RPM is used by 
 286. See Easterbrook, supra note 64, at 465. In effect, these are “sunk” costs that can only be 
recovered by conducting business in that particular market. 
 287. See, e.g., Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 88 (1902) (observing that a party may 
successfully defend a breach of contract action by proving that the contract violates the Sherman Act); 
McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 670 (1899) (refusing to enforce a bid-rigging contract against a 
breaching party). 
 288. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 146 (1968) (White, J., 
concurring). 
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manufacturers to induce dealers to perform some productive economic 
function. Where all consumers benefit, there is a loss neither of efficiency 
nor of consumer surplus.289 Nevertheless, dealers can suffer actual injuries. 
Suppose a manufacturer imposes RPM in order to induce dealers to provide 
product-specific services. A dealer might fail to provide the services, shade 
the fixed resale price, and earn as profits the difference between his relatively 
low costs and the revenue generated by the fixed resale price. If he is 
terminated, he suffers a loss.290 Or a dealer might adhere to the fixed resale 
price but thereby lose profits on additional sales he might have made at a 
lower price. In neither case, however, does the loss satisfy an economic 
definition of antitrust injury. 
The terminated dealer skimping on services earned profits by free-riding 
on the services provided by others. These lost profits, however, cannot be 
connected to any inefficiency caused by RPM, because RPM in these 
circumstances increases efficiency. Indeed, if rampant free-riding forced the 
manufacturer to abandon RPM, and if no substitute mechanism was available 
or was as efficient, the resulting loss of product-specific services would 
injure consumers. Recognizing the loss of terminated free-riding dealers as 
antitrust injury would perversely injure consumers. Of course, absent RPM 
or an alternative, the product-specific services would disappear, and the 
formerly free-riding dealer would have to compete with other dealers, none 
of whom would be providing services. One could argue that loss of profits 
made possible by an illegal arrangement—here, the RPM agreements—
cannot constitute antitrust injury.291 But that analysis relies woodenly on the 
illegality of RPM agreements, even though RPM in these circumstances 
causes no anticompetitive harm. The better position is that the injury is 
unconnected to any anticompetitive harm. While some courts have held on 
one basis or another that dealers terminated for failing to adhere to RPM 
agreements suffer no antitrust injury,292 others have reached the opposite 
result.293
 289. If only some consumers benefit, RPM may reduce efficiency and consumer surplus, but these 
instances cannot be isolated in litigation. 
 290. A dealer that provides the services and shades the resale price is not likely to be terminated. 
 291. See Local Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Lamaur, Inc., 787 F.2d 1197, 1202 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(observing that a free-riding dealer “was profiting from the antitrust violation itself”). 
 292. See, e.g., Haynes Trane Serv. Agency, Inc. v. Am. Standard, Inc., 51 Fed. Appx. 786, 803 
(10th Cir. 2002); Local Beauty Supply, 787 F.2d at 1202–03. 
 293. See, e.g., Pace Elecs., Inc. v. Canon Computer Sys., Inc., 213 F.3d 118, 121–23 (3d Cir. 
2000); First Med Representatives, LLC v. Futura Med. Corp., 195 F. Supp. 2d 917, 923–25 (E.D. 
Mich. 2002). In DeLong Equip. v. Wash. Mills Electro Minerals Corp., 990 F.2d 1186, 1198–99 (11th 
Cir. 1993), the court found that a terminated dealer suffered antitrust injury in an unusual setting in 
which the dealer was not free riding. The RPM agreement allegedly was used to dupe a customer into 
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Suppose, however, that a dealer provides all of the services of other 
dealers, but is terminated for charging less than the minimum resale price. 
That dealer is more efficient than his competitors, and he suffers an actual 
injury in the form of loss of the economic profit he was able to earn while 
selling the product. The manufacturer, of course, has an incentive to 
distribute its products through the most efficient dealers; the lower the 
distribution costs, the higher the manufacturer’s potential profits. The 
manufacturer, therefore, would seem to have no reason to terminate the 
dealer. But if the dealer cannot expand sufficiently, and if his efficiencies 
cannot be quickly duplicated, the manufacturer may prefer to sacrifice the 
dealer in order to retain the rest of its dealers. In that event, part of the loss 
suffered by the dealer is connected to an inefficiency. The dealer might have 
charged the stipulated minimum resale price and earned a larger margin of 
accounting profits than his competitors. If he had been terminated anyway, 
his exit from the market would have worked a loss of productive efficiency, 
but not allocative efficiency. The hypothetical dealer shading the resale price 
would have wanted to increase total accounting profits by increasing volume, 
largely at the expense of less efficient dealers. His exit causes a loss of both 
productive and allocative efficiency. The problem with allowing the dealer to 
recover, however, is that his presence in the market threatened the viability of 
other distributors, and his removal from the market may in fact result in 
greater consumer surplus. Perhaps not. But normally where the interests of 
the manufacturer are aligned with the interests of consumers, the 
manufacturer’s judgment is the best guide to efficient results. 
Some consumers may not value the services induced by RPM, however, 
and as discussed above, RPM in these circumstances may even result in a net 
loss of consumer surplus.294 Whether RPM increases or decreases consumer 
welfare, terminating a discounting dealer injures both the dealer and the 
consumer who does not value the services. By assumption, there is no free-
riding in this situation, and if RPM actually reduces consumer welfare, the 
dealer’s injury in fact is connected to the inefficiency caused by RPM. But 
the predicate cannot sensibly be proven in litigation, and if RPM on balance 
increases consumer welfare, the dealer’s injury, by definition, cannot flow 
from an anticompetitive loss in the market. Just as practical constraints 
prevent consumers from establishing that they did not value services, they 
prevent dealers from establishing that consumers did not value services.  
 
 
paying excessive prices for a product. See id. at 1191. 
 294. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
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One could argue, of course, that antitrust injury should not be limited to 
losses that flow from an anticompetitive aspect of a practice, economically 
defined. Indeed, antitrust injury must be broader than an economic concept 
because RPM is illegal per se, and if a dealer is required to prove some 
inefficiency and link his injury to it, RPM is transformed into a rule-of-
reason violation.295 Therefore, the protection of dealer freedom should be 
recognized as an independent antitrust goal, and any loss suffered by a dealer 
terminated for exercising his freedom is connected to that which makes the 
practice unlawful. But the Court no longer takes seriously the idea that a 
restriction on dealer freedom by itself justifies per se illegality;296 the Court 
in Business Electronics observed that RPM is illegal per se because it can 
facilitate cartels.297 The logical flaw in Business Electronics is the implicit 
assumption that cartel facilitation accounts for a large percentage of the times 
RPM is used. Requiring a dealer to establish that RPM in a particular case 
has an adverse economic impact—the kind of impact that justifies per se 
illegality—is a second-best alternative to holding that only some instances of 
RPM are unlawful.298 But it respects the fundamental rationale for outlawing 
the practice. Moreover, to divorce antitrust injury from economic impact is to 
destroy the significance of the requirement. Any injury in fact caused by 
RPM becomes antitrust injury. 
Even if the harm suffered by terminated dealers is considered antitrust 
injury, calculating damages would be immensely difficult. The dealer would 
at most be entitled to recover lost profits, and their calculation would require 
an estimate of the profits the dealer would have earned had no RPM plan 
been used. For the reasons suggested above, that but-for world is resistant to 
proof. 
A dealer that acquiesces in an efficiency-enhancing RPM agreement 
cannot establish antitrust injury for essentially the same reasons that a 
terminated dealer cannot prove it. The dealer claims injury in fact on the 
ground that he could have sold more volume at a lower price. The 
acquiescing dealer wanted to free-ride on the services provided by other 
 295. See, e.g., Pace Elecs., 213 F.3d at 123 (reasoning that to require a dealer to establish that 
RPM “caused an actual, adverse effect on a relevant market in order to satisfy the antitrust injury 
requirement comes dangerously close to transforming a per se violation into a case to be judged under 
the rule of reason”). 
 296. For example, maximum resale price fixing inhibits dealer freedom, and yet the Court found 
that the effect was not enough to justify per se illegality. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 
(1997).  
 297. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. 
 298. See, e.g., Liebeler, supra note 162, at 903 (arguing that Business Electronics should be 
interpreted to hold that the “per se rule . . . appl[ies] to intrabrand RPM only when it is likely to 
facilitate interbrand cartels”). 
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dealers, exploit its efficiency advantage, or cater to customers who did not 
value the services; the terminated dealer actually lowered price to accomplish 
one of the objectives, and was cut off for the effort. And just as terminated 
dealers would struggle to prove damages coherently, so too would 
acquiescing dealers. 
3. Other Rationales 
As indicated above, some models of RPM have ambiguous welfare 
effects.299 The use of RPM to address demand uncertainty produces no 
antitrust injury for consumers,300 and it produces no antitrust injury for 
dealers. A dealer could be injured in fact only during periods of low 
demand—when the fixed resale price is higher than the but-for price—if he 
would have earned profits from lowering price. RPM performs a productive 
economic function in responding to risk, and any loss suffered by interfering 
with that function cannot be antitrust injury. If RPM used in conjunction with 
franchise fees by manufacturers competing for distributors causes any 
welfare loss, the cognizable injury is suffered by consumers; any harm 
suffered by a dealer stems from free-riding. Dealers subject to RPM 
agreements that are used in lieu of slotting allowances to allocate scarce shelf 
space suffer no harm. 
Finally, RPM used as a method of price discrimination does not cause 
dealers antitrust injury. Price discrimination enables the manufacturer to 
extract more consumer surplus than it could earn by charging a single 
monopoly price. But the manufacturer wants a competitive dealer market 
whether it price discriminates or not. The only dealer that could suffer injury 
in fact is a dealer who circumvents or wants to circumvent the 
manufacturer’s strategy by selling product intended for low-value users to 
high-value users at low prices. The dealer would thereby divert some of the 
consumer surplus to itself. A wealth transfer without an accompanying 
deadweight loss may or may not contravene the purposes of the antitrust law. 
If it does not, a dealer’s loss of the profits that the manufacturer was entitled 
to earn cannot be connected to that which makes RPM unlawful. If it does, 
no dealer has the right to claim damages based on the assumption that he 
would be the only dealer breaking the RPM agreement. If RPM agreements 
were ignored generally by dealers, and price discrimination thereby thwarted, 
no dealer would earn economic profits.  
 299. See supra notes 249–82 and accompanying text. 
 300. See supra notes 250–57 and accompanying text. 
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E. Summary 
Both consumers and distributors face substantial difficulties in proving 
injury in fact, antitrust injury, antitrust standing, and damages. No single 
economic theory explains all uses of RPM. Moreover, the evidence is that 
RPM can be either anticompetitive or procompetitive. What is apparent is 
that the competitive effects of any specific instance of RPM cannot be 
assessed without an evaluation of market structure, the specific RPM plan 
employed, and the likely effects on the performance of the industry 
overall.301 Such an evaluation presents a formidable hurdle for the private 
plaintiff, whether consumer or dealer, in pursuit of a treble damage award. 
V. SETTLEMENTS 
In spite of the enormous difficulties associated with establishing antitrust 
injury and constructing an economically sound damage model in an RPM 
case, many cases settle. Typically, RPM cases on behalf of consumers are 
filed as class actions.302 Though it is our view that class certification is 
problematic in most instances,303 some classes are certified and settlement 
usually follows. If the plaintiffs were required to put forward an 
economically sound damage model, it is likely that the defendant would 
prevail due to the significant difficulties faced by plaintiffs that we have 
outlined in the preceding Section. But the fact that settlements often follow 
class certification is not necessarily a sign that the defendant fails to 
recognize these difficulties or that it has a weak case. Instead, these 
settlements may reflect informed economic reasoning. 
From a defendant’s perspective, there may be some (subjective) 
probability (p) that the class would prevail on liability and damages. If the 
plaintiff prevails, it will receive three times the damages (D) plus the costs of 
suit (CP). In addition, the defendant will have its own (considerable) litigation 
costs (CD). For a defendant, there is little upside to litigation. The expected 
loss (L) of proceeding to trial is 
E[L] = p (3D) + p CP + CD,
 301. This, of course, implies that a rule of reason approach should be applied to RPM cases if the 
goal of the antitrust laws is to promote consumer welfare. But RPM remains per se illegal. 
 302. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979); Beckers v. Int’l Snowmobile Indus. 
Ass’n, 581 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1978); Gross v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 242 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). Because a consumer’s injury is likely to be too small to justify the costs of litigation, 
it stands to reason that consumers would not sue unless their claims could be aggregated in a class 
action. 
 303. See Roger D. Blair & Jill Boylston Herndon, Class Actions in Resale Price Maintenance 
Cases, 48 ANTITRUST BULL. 571 (2003). 
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where E denotes the expectations operator. If the defendant can settle the suit 
for less than the expected loss, it is economically rational to do so (even 
when the defendant did not violate the law). Similarly, the plaintiff will settle 
if the settlement amount is more than the expected gain from litigation.304 In 
the preceding Sections, we outlined the formidable difficulties in proving 
damages in RPM cases. These difficulties decrease the probability of a 
successful outcome from the plaintiff’s perspective. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the vast academic literature demonstrating that RPM often has 
procompetitive effects and should be evaluated under the rule of reason, the 
Supreme Court continues to condemn it as per se illegal under the antitrust 
laws. The per se rule, coupled with the lure of treble damages, presents a 
seemingly lucrative opportunity to recover damages when the fact of RPM 
can be established. The paradox is that though plaintiffs may be able to prove 
a per se violation and, therefore, prove liability, they may be unable to prove 
actual injury, antitrust injury, or antitrust damages when RPM plans, in fact, 
have no net adverse impact on consumer welfare. This incongruity arises 
because RPM plans may have anticompetitive effects, procompetitive 
effects, or confounding effects. To prevail on their damage claims, private 
plaintiffs must sort out these effects. Identifying the underlying motivation 
for a particular RPM plan and its competitive effects is no mean feat, and 
private plaintiffs in RPM cases often face difficult, if not insurmountable, 
hurdles in proving their eligibility to recover. Dr. Miles set the stage for the 
vexing problems of private enforcement by declaring RPM per se unlawful 
without clearly identifying the competitive ill the Court was trying to 
prevent. The current confusion could be lessened significantly if the Court 
would either single out the anticompetitive uses of RPM programs for per se 
condemnation or scrap the rule of per se illegality altogether, replacing it 
with the rule of reason or a rule of per se legality.  
How does the law reconcile the per se illegality of an economically 
ambiguous practice with enforcement doctrines that permit only those 
 304. It is possible to model the decision to settle more formally. In a relatively simple model 
where the parties are risk-neutral and there are no settlement costs, a settlement occurs when the 
expected loss of going to trial for the defendant exceeds the expected gain for the plaintiff. In the event 
of a settlement, the defendant will pay a sum that is less than (or equal to) the expected loss. This is the 
result in the text. Several models employ the theory of rational expectations to analyze settlements. See 
John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, 
An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973). 
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directly suffering anticompetitive harm to sue and require them to prove 
damages coherently? Uncomfortably. 
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